Of stunning, short-lived cactus flowers and quad bikes

The smoke from the mine:

It has been a frighteningly bad month in the mining industry internationally.  OHS meetings I attended during this period have been hushed as a result of the New Zealand tragedies.  Discussions about OHS have become more pertinent and more accurate – for the time being.  But this, like stunning but short-lived cactus flowers, will quickly disappear.

Because I’ve had close involvement with the Beaconsfield Gold Mine rockfall that killed Larry Knight, and years earlier with the Esso Longford explosions and fires in Victoria, the CrossCity tunnel fatality in Sydney… and many other tragedies or near misses, such events, like a sudden cramp, re-focus my thinking on current issues.  Another OHS failure that we didn’t stop.

Quad bike safety:

One such issue I’ve been involved in for some time has been the quad bike safety issue. The fatality statistics I have on these machines in Australia show that over the last 10 years 13 people (on average) are killed per year.  130 people, most of whom, the industry will have you believe, were ‘mis-users’ of the machines (see below).  The trend is up not down.

I have just resigned from the TransTasman Quad Bike safety committee created by the regulators last year.   The OHS and quad bike interest group in the community may be interested in some of the difficulties I see with the current work on this issue.

The obvious and useless in practice:

I think a much greater degree of transparency and openness – including a high level public conference – ought to take place.  And neither the regulators nor industry will be interested in that; Continue reading “Of stunning, short-lived cactus flowers and quad bikes”

Computer simulations of quad bike risks do not reflect reality

Guest contributor David Robertson discusses the  differences between risk simulations and real risk data in relation to quad bike safety:

“The motion picture blockbuster “Avatar”, for the time we are in the cinema, would have us believe that Sam Worthington can turn into a giant blue man on a faraway planet.  James Cameron used computers to deliver us this illusion. In science (and particularly with safety) we must be able to distinguish between computers that are valuable tools and computers that don’t represent reality.  Dynamic Research, Inc.(DRI) chose 113 actual quad bike (ATV) accidents to simulate in a computer model.

The first table below shows the injuries DRI record as what really happened from all the 113 cases, but represented as approximate normalized injury cost (ANIC)*.   When DRI’s computer runs the same cases, one would expect a similar result.  The results are shown in the second table (ANIC), note the scale on the left has had to be changed (table 2 should be about 10 times taller if the same scale in table 1 was used) because head injuries rose from 360 points to well over 3000. Equally astonishingly is that abdomen injuries have vanished altogether and chest injuries dropped from 266 to a next to nothing (23). Asphyxiation was not even included in the computer model. Continue reading “Computer simulations of quad bike risks do not reflect reality”

Politics overrides safety

Why has the Australian government refused to release the investigation report into the Montara oil spill?

SafetyAtWorkBlog’s interest in this report is principally over the identification of potential risk control measures that could reduce the chances of another deep-sea oil rig exploding or identify any design or safety features that could stop such a savage leak of oil into the community.

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported on 12 August 2010 about the devastation to East Timor’s fishing and seaweed industries as a result of the spill in 2009 .  An earlier media report about Indonesia seeking compensation for its seaweed beds is available HERE.

The Australian Resources Minister, Martin Ferguson, said on 11 August 2010:

“The lessons to be learned from Montara, and I might say the Gulf [of Mexico], create a clear need in a very sensitive, important national industry, both environmentally, economically and from a health and safety point of view, for a strong single national regulator that’s well resourced and focussed,” ……

This may be the way to go but AAP reports that Ferguson he is refusing to release the investigation report until after the August 2010 general election!! Continue reading “Politics overrides safety”

OHS Professional magazine is a mish-mash

The Safety Institute of Australia‘s OHS Professional magazine has been out for a couple of editions now and the good news is that it is improving.  The sad part is that it remains well-behind other OHS magazines.

The latest edition has contributions, finally, from a freelance writer, Liam Tung.  Liam is not an OHS professional, to my knowledge, and this shows a little in some of the generalized elements of his articles.  But the articles are at least original content and this addresses a repeated criticism of the magazine.

The SIA runs many OHS conferences but very rarely ever see these as sources of content.  The current edition of OHS Professional comes with a supplement of some article from the 2010 Safety In Action Conference.  It is a good souvenir of the conference but is very thin. Continue reading “OHS Professional magazine is a mish-mash”

The importance of evidence in OHS decision-making

There are a couple of actions in Australia’s OHS profession that are worth linking together.  The first is occurring outside OHS as well and that is the demand for evidence-based decision making.  The second is the push by the Safety Institute of Australia and others to establish a core body of OHS knowledge.

On the first point a recent Editorial in Elsevier’s “Policy and Safety” journal summarise the recent evolution of evidence-based decision making and evidence-based polices (EBP) which gained credence through the governments of Tony Blair particularly.  The editorial states that much of this push is a management strategy

“…based on the common-sense notion that business strategies and directions are underpinned by a solid information base will be superior to navigating without reliable charts and compass.”

In some ways this “notion” may be an assumption or an ideal.  The notion is sound, as far as it goes but, according to the editorial, evidence could be better used informing policy rather than providing the foundation.  Continue reading “The importance of evidence in OHS decision-making”

Safety Cases must become a reality in the US

Some of the media, over the weekend, was critical of BP for not applying a Safety Case to the BP/Deepwater horizon oil rig.  The Safety Case is an established method of assessing risk in high-hazard organisations and should have been applied.  Whether such a technique would have made any difference is debatable as it is hypothetical.

Safety Case regimes have proven effective and are used as a default risk setting in many corporations but the story is not only one of a specific Safety Case missed opportunity.  BP is an example of corporate hypocrisy that supports the cynicism of the community to large corporations whose actions do not reflect their commitment. Continue reading “Safety Cases must become a reality in the US”

New UK podcast on drilling regulation

HSE podcasts are almost always worth listening to.  The June 2010 podcast capitalises on the topicality of offshore oil drilling generated by the BP incident in the Gulf of Mexico.

The podcast is available for listening online

The important element of the podcast is whether such deepwater drilling incidents could occur elsewhere?  This is useful not only for the UK jurisdiction but for Europe and Australia.

The interview discusses the value of a “safety case” regulatory regime and the disadvantages of a prescriptive regime.

Interestingly the UK wells are individually notified to HSE almost a month before drilling is due to commence.  This allows for an assessment of the well design and structure prior to activation.

Clearly, this approach stems from the Piper Alpha explosion in 1988.  The BP Gulf incident can be considered the United States’ Piper Alpha.

It raises the question of did BP, an English company that should have been well aware of the usefulness of the safety case approach to drilling, apply a different approach to its Gulf drilling contractors to that applied elsewhere, and why?  Was BP really committed to “best practice” in safety, or as it called it “beyond the best“?

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