law – Page 250 – SafetyAtWorkBlog

Peanut allergy fatality saga to continue

Safety management in the education sector seems to be one of the hardest management challenges. There are overlapping safety obligations through OHS legislation, education department guidelines, public health matters and meeting the demands of parents and students.

A decision in the Federal Court of Australia on 30 June 2009 illustrates the challenges.

A 13 year old boy from Scotch College, in Melbourne, Nathan Francis, died after eating from a ration pack of beef satay on a Defence Forces camp. The school, which was supervising the camp, were aware of the boy’s severe allergy to peanuts.

The Australian Department of Defence was fined over $A200,000.

The full judgement of the court raises several issues that are relevant to the management of safety of people in one’s care. The judge has recommended a State coronial inquest to determine the roles and responsibilities of Scotch College in Nathan’s death.

Justice for Nathan and his family is likely to have many more months to go. [ SafetyAtWorkBlog will follow the issue.]

A fantastic audio report on the decision is available at the ABC website. The payment of the fine back to the government is not dealt with in this blog.

The first section of the judgement (below) indicates what the judge believes are the failures that need to be addressed through an appropriate safety process:

Communication;
Instruction;
Provision of appropriate supplies;
The importance of labelling; and
Following procedures and guidelines

Some readers may find that this prosecution could make an interesting case study for safety management.

Kevin Jones

Justice North found that the Federal OHS Act was breached by the Commonwealth government through the Chief of Army. The respondent

(a) supplied Cadet Nathan Fazal Francis, Cadet Nivae Anandaganeshan and Cadet Gene van den Broek with one-man combat ration packs (CRP’s) containing a satay beef food pouch which contained peanuts or peanut protein for their consumption despite having been informed that the said cadets were allergic to peanuts;
and, in so doing, it failed to:

(b) warn parents of the [Australian Army Cadets] AAC cadets about the contents of the CRP’s;

(c) warn AAC cadets about the contents of CRP’s;

(d) warn AAC cadets with pre-existing food allergies of the contents of CRP’s;

(e) make appropriate use of information provided by AAC cadets and parents of AAC cadets regarding pre-existing or known allergic conditions and correlate that information with the potential risk of being exposed to allergies through the supply of food contained in CRP’s;

(f) ensure that the contents of CRP’s allocated to AAC cadets did not include food products or allergens that may have triggered allergic responses by removing or requiring the removal of peanut-based food products from CRP’s;

(g) prevent distribution or provision of peanut-based food products to AAC cadets with pre-existing allergic reactions by:

i. inspecting the contents of CRP’s to be allocated to those individual AAC cadets who had given notice of allergic conditions;

ii. isolating cadets with pre-existing medical conditions and/or notified food allergies at the time of distribution of CRP’s and issuing them with CRP’s that did not contain peanut products or other food allergens;

iii. removing all CRP’s known to contain peanut protein or other food allergens from circulation amongst AAC cadets;

iv. requiring all AAC cadets with notified allergic conditions to provide their own food supplies;

(h) issue any or any adequate instructions or provide adequate supervision regarding distribution of CRP’s;

(i) issue any adequate instructions or provide adequate supervision regarding consumption of contents of CRP’s;

(j) prevent the consumption of CRP’s containing food allergens by AAC cadets with food allergies;

(k) distribute CRP’s after consulting or considering pre-existing medical conditions; and

(l) take into consideration the findings of a report dated 22 November 1996 by the Australian National Audit Office entitled ‘Management of Food Provisioning in the Australian Defence Force’.

Varanus Island is back to normal

According to various Australian media reports, the natural gas plant at Varanus Island in Western Australia is now back to full capacity following the major pipeline explosion in 2008.

The government has estimated that the explosion blasted $A2 billion from the state economy and will be pursuing the pipeline’s owner, Apache Energy, through the courts.

The government says the pipeline was inadequately maintained and corrosion led to the failure of the pipe.

Apache has already been in the courts seeking an injunction to stop the Western Australian Mines & Petroleum Minister, Norman Moore, from seeing a “a federal-state government report into alleged regulatory lapses that may have contributed to the Varanus Island blast”.

Apache’s move is peculiar but the WA government has become more involved in the investigation of this explosion than others and the company has not been happy with the investigation process for some time.

Kevin Jones

Latest guidance on working alone

Western Australia’s WorkSafe has just released its latest guidance on working alone and it is the most practical look at the hazard from any OHS regulator in Australia.

Importantly, it differentiates between “alone” and “remote”. In 1995, when the Victorian First Aid Code of Practice raised the issue of isolation, there was considerable confusion. How can someone in the metropolitan area be isolated or remote?

Undertaking an assessment of first aid needs of a multi-storey building which has cleaners or nightshift working at 2am.
Working alone in a petrol station in an outer suburb.
(Sadly) showing a potential client a new property in a new real estate development on the fringes of the city.
Security guard walking the perimeter of an industrial site
Delivering pizzas at 3am
Home visits from medical specialists

The WA definition of “alone” is very useful and needs to be kept front-of-mind in OHS policy and procedure production. It could be used in the review process of existing policies and prores to ensure their applicability.

“A person is alone at work when they are on their own, when they cannot be seen or heard by another person, and when they cannot expect a visit from another worker or member of the public for some time.”

The working alone guidance identifies four industry types that require special support for working alone:

Agriculture
Pastoral
Forestry
Mining

Although SafetyAtWorkBlog advocates low-tech control options as much as possible (usually because of increased reliability) thankfully this guidance discusses mobile phones, satellite communications, GPS locators and other communications devices.

Kevin Jones

OHS crime alert

In late June 2009, WorkSafe Victoria tried a new approach to raising the awareness of the criminal status of OHS breaches through producing a formatted media alert and placing an ad in the daily newspapers.

It is unclear how else the “flyer” will be distributed other than through the WorkSafe website. Indications are that a hard copy of the alert for distribution through WorkSafe offices is not planned.

The ad, pictured right, refers to the prosecution of Rapid Roller over the second serious lathe incident at that workplace in 12 months, the most recent resulting in a death.

Kevin Jones

Trained first aiders in “low risk” microbusinesses

WorkSafe contacted me today concerning some issues raised in a previous post concerning their first aid information. Some small tweaks have been made to that post but one point required elaboration. There is some dispute over whether low risk micro businesses require a trained first aider. Below is my position.

FIRST AID NEEDS ASSESSMENT

The First Aid Compliance Code discusses a first aid needs assessment. In our experience of assessing scores of workplaces, large and small, for first aid needs (including over 28 McDonald’s restaurants but that’s another story), we are convinced that a workplace that relies on others to provide an acceptable level of emergency first aid response would expose the employer to avoidable legal issues. Unless, of course, one relies on “as far as is reasonably practicable” after someone may have been seriously injured or died on your premises. It is doubtful that the relatives of the deceased would be so forgiving. (Consider the actions of concerned relatives following the Kerang court case decision.)

Ask yourself, is it better to have a trained first aider on site just in case, or rely on an ambulance being readily available and render no assistance?

Time is crucial in an emergency, with the risk of a person’s condition becoming more serious the longer treatment is delayed. Emergency ambulances, even in metropolitan areas, can be delayed and, in an emergency, waiting with an unconscious and/or non-breathing person will seem an eternity. Any delay in rendering appropriate first aid treatment will complicate proving that an appropriate duty of care was applied in the circumstance.

The Australian Resuscitation Council has made its guidelines available online. For those interested in establishing an appropriate level of first aid response for their workplaces, the guidelines are recommended to read. But more importantly is the need to have suitably trained first aiders on site, particularly after an assessment of the workplace’s first aid needs has been conducted. A first aid kit is next to useless if CPR is required.

Of course, the need for first aid is minimised if all the other OHS matters are dealt with first in an orderly safety management system.

Kevin Jones

2006 interview with Dr Jukka Takala of EU-OSHA

In October 2006, I interviewed Dr Jukka Takala for the SafetyAtWork podcast. Jukka had just taken over as director of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work from Hans-Horst Konkolewsky.

The agency has continued its important work but seems since 2006 to focus more on the EU internal requirements rather than reaching out globally as before. This is understandable given the influx of new EU member states over that time but it is disappointing when an OHS “regulator’s” website has so many dead links to its former international partners.

The 2006 podcast is available for download.

The transcript of an earlier interview I conducted with Jukka in his ILO days is available by clicking the cover image below.

Kevin Jones

Level crossings and safety management

Regular readers will know that SafetyAWorkBlog believes that there is little justification for road/rail crossings, particularly in metropolitan areas, and that grade separation should be the aim of any crossing upgrades. Too often governments dismiss grade separation without serious consideration because it is usually the most expensive control option. Regardless of expense, elimination of hazards must be considered in public safety policy and OHS. It is only after the elimination of a hazard is seriously considered that lower order control measures are seen to be valid.

At the moment in Victoria, there is community outrage because the truck driver involved in the deaths of 11 train passengers at a level crossing at Kerang has been cleared of any legal responsibility for the deaths. Several relatives of victims are pursuing civil action against the driver, Mr Christiaan Scholl.

The wisdom of civil action against the driver is debatable as any potential financial “win” will come from the insurance pockets of the Transport Accident Commission and not Mr Scholl. Compensation may be gained but any hope that the action could be seen as a “penalty” is false.

The Kerang rail crossing illustrates some basic OHS issues:

Worker responsibility

The Kerang level crossing had design deficiencies that had repeatedly identified by a number of government authorities, local companies and the public. The court case heard that the crossing was known to be dangerous.

In OHS, known hazards are controlled in a number of ways. Clearly the rail and road traffic was not separated and engineering controls were not introduced at the time of the incident. The owners of the crossing (and this is debated also) determined that signage was appropriate (or even perhaps “as far as is reasonably practicable”?).

Clearly signage was not adequate but there is also the issue of driver (worker) responsibility. It was mentioned in court and repeatedly in the media that the level crossing was known to be dangerous. Why then, would drivers continue to treat the crossing as if it was not? The legal speed limits remained at 100kph, at the time of the incident. The road laws clearly state that road traffic must give way to rail traffic and yet drivers have admitted to complacency.

This is perhaps the source of a lot of the community outrage in relation to the Kerang incident. The findings in favour of the driver place all the responsibility for the incident on the inadequate design of the crossing.

Working environment

As employers have responsibility to ensure a safe and health work environment, so government has a social and legal obligation to make public areas safe. Victorian governments for decades have neglected the hazards presented by inadequately designed or controlled level crossings. Governments must take responsibility for inaction just as much as taking credit for action and infrastructure improvements.

Infrastructure spending had started to increase prior to the incident but the need was sharply illustrated through the unnecessary deaths of 11 rail passengers. Many Australian governments are spending millions of dollars on rail/road crossing upgrades as a result of the Kerang incident.

Road Safety and OHS

Many OHS professionals illustrate OHS by drawing on road safety. The correlation is very poor but the attempt is understandable – most people drive, they drive within strict laws that were learnt in training (induction), and the road laws are enforced by an external body (police = WorkSafe. However, this relationship has no corresponding role for employers, who have a workplace responsibility. The road user has a direct relationship with the regulator. In OHS the role of the employer is crucial.

Perhaps the Kerang incident and other level crossing incidents could be used in brainstorming to illustrate personal accountability, employer accountability and government responsibility. It would be a worthwhile exercise to discuss whether road safety and workplace safety could share as many educative elements as some of the advocates suggest.

As with most posts on SafetyAtWorkBlog, these thoughts are a work-in-progress and debate and commentary are welcome.

Kevin Jones

Note: SafetyAtWorkBlog is not privy to any of the court evidence and must rely on media reports. More information will be presented when available.

Category: law

Peanut allergy fatality saga to continue

Like this:

Varanus Island is back to normal

Like this:

Latest guidance on working alone

Like this:

OHS crime alert

Like this:

Trained first aiders in “low risk” microbusinesses

Like this:

2006 interview with Dr Jukka Takala of EU-OSHA

Like this:

Level crossings and safety management

Like this:

Share this:

Like this:

Share this:

Like this:

Share this:

Like this:

Share this:

Like this:

Share this:

Like this:

Share this:

Like this:

Share this:

Like this: