railroad – Page 4 – SafetyAtWorkBlog

Mining company trial set over cyclone deaths

Further to the SafetyAtWorkBlog article about the prosecution of Fortescue Metals Group, The Australian newspaper reports on 28 April 2010 that the trial will start tomorrow.

The article states that

“Lawyers for the Department of Commerce — prosecuting the case through WorkSafe — successfully argued the site was not a mine and was instead a camp for workers constructing a railway to transport iron ore.”

The company was arguing that the site was a mining support site and that its contractors were responsible.

Interestingly the Magistrate, Joe Randazzo, wants a definition of “safe refuge”. This may lead to a reconsideration of the use of dongas, or temporary accommodation units, in areas of extreme weather conditions. There is the potential for safety improvements from this case and not just a punishment.

Kevin Jones

Fortescue Metals contests cyclone deaths

In December 2008 Fortescue Metals Group said it would contest charges it breached OHS laws over the death of two people. In April 2010, it is seeking to avoid the charges.

On March 9 2007, tropical cyclone George hit a camp site in north-west Australia killing two people and injuring others. The temporary accommodation shelters, “dongas”, in which workers were sheltering provided insufficient protection for many workers.

According to one media report on 12 April 2010, the lawyer for FMG, John Karkar,

“…. said his clients’ operations were governed by the Mines Safety Inspections Act because the Pilbara camp was built for the accommodation of mine workers and workers who were building a railway line which was to be used to transport iron ore.” Continue reading “Fortescue Metals contests cyclone deaths”

Government can do much better on level crossing safety

The Victorian Government is likely to say the Auditor-General’s report into “Management of Safety Risks at Level Crossings“, released on 24 March 2010, supports the government’s initiatives. This is true but the report says much more than just describing the State Government’s efforts as “satisfactory”. (If my child’s report card said satisfactory, I would be talking to the teacher about why the performance was only “satisfactory”)

The report summary says the following:

“The rate of progress in improving safety and reducing accidents has been satisfactory. There are, however, elements of the risk management framework and its application that can be improved.”

These elements are specified as

“improving how the committee is informed of the views of the rail managers, who run train services and maintain the infrastructure, about their risks and priorities

assembling information that will allow the committee to effectively manage and monitor the delivery of the Towards Zero strategy

improving the understanding of what causes level crossing collisions.” [link added]

Clearly the Parliamentary committee is not getting the full risk story from the rail managers. Continue reading “Government can do much better on level crossing safety”

Level crossing investigation reports

The Victorian Auditor-General is conducting an investigation into the “management of safety risks at level crossings”. Victoria’s Coroner is also investigating several, of the many, deaths at level crossings.

According to the Auditor-General’s website the level crossing report will be tabled in Parliament next month. It is understood that the three nominated level crossing hearings of the Victorian Coroner will commence sometime in 2010. Continue reading “Level crossing investigation reports”

Big fine for Queensland Rail – big risks in rail

Almost two years ago, two rail workers died in Queensland. According to the official report into the incident:

“At approximately 1056 on Friday 7 December 2007, two QR [Queensland Rail] Infrastructure Services Group (ISG) track workers were fatally injured as a consequence of being struck by a track machine (train) at Mindi, approximately 130 kilometres south-west of Mackay.

The collision occurred when Track Machine MMA59, in the process of conducting track resurfacing work on the Down line at Mindi, commenced a routine reversing movement.

During the process, two QR Systems Maintenance personnel, working on the same track and behind the track machine, were struck and fatally injured by this track machine.

Analysis of evidence and conditions surrounding the accident revealed:

An overall lack of compliance with elements of the QR SMS at the Mindi site; and

Inadequate communication and coordination between workgroups at the Mindi site.”

On 26 November 2009, Queensland Rail was fined $A650,000 over the deaths. The fine is only $A100,000 below the maximum fine applicable. According to a media release about the fine:

“The Workplace Health and Safety Queensland investigation found that QR’s safety management systems were inadequate for managing the separation of workers and plant, particularly when both were within the same section of track between signals.

It also found that QR knew the systems were inadequate and not working because it had been highlighted to management in a series of audits.”

Not only were Queensland Rail’s safety management systems inadequate, Queensland Rail knew they were inadequate because a series of audits had told it so.

Railway in Australia and elsewhere is one of the most regulated industries. It is also one of the industries with the most prescriptive set of rules. It is a complicated business but one where hazards are known and systems are in place to control these hazards.

The extent of QR’s failure to operate safely can be illustrated by some of the many recommendations made in 2008 by Queensland Transport:

The necessity for consistent and effective Worksite Safety Briefings by ISG personnel;

Preconditions to the reversal of vehicles in accordance with QR safeworking requirements;

Responsibilities and training syllabi for ISG Resurfacing personnel;

The necessity for pre-departure safety checks on ISG trains;

Provision of safe separation and segregation between ISG track workers and trains;

ISG SMS compliance monitoring, at the local level;

Fatigue management within QR, and in particular ISG rostering;

Management of the perceived relationship between ISG and Network Control;

Awareness of the priority of safety over commercial pressures by remote ISG staff;

Distribution of safety communications and documents within QR;

Representation for relevant stakeholders in operational change management processes;

Risk and change management training for ISG operational personnel;

Safety risks presented to ISG through the permanent coupling of track machines;

The safety value to QR of an enhanced and transparent reporting system;

The management of ISG district staff relationship issues; and

ISG and Network Access radio protocol compliance monitoring.

Many elements are familiar to other investigations in rail and other industries – fatigue, on-site communication, training, segregation, document control and distribution, local compliance enforcement, transparency in reporting…..

On 10 September 2008, the QR CEO Lance Hockridge said:

“When I arrived in November 2007, I found an organisation with a safety record that was improving but not what it should be. Only three weeks later we had a very tragic reminder of this when work colleagues Jamie Adams and Gary Watkins were killed at Mindi.

“Organisations hoping to achieve meaningful change must firstly be honest with themselves – we need to confront this reality and make the changes required.”

Queensland Rail did not face the reality of problems identified by safety auditors and two workers died.

The news of the record fine came at a time when the ownership of Victoria’s metropolitan rail network has changed from Connex to Metro. Victoria has a stressed rail service but has managed to avoid the controversy of Queensland Rail and RailCorp in New South Wales but this has been through luck rather than good management. The Victorian Government, and particularly the Transport Minister, Lynne Kosky, needs to read the Waterfall Inquiry report and the Queensland Mindi report to understand the personal, economic and political cost of not having a tightly managed, functional rail safety regime. Having been in power for just over 10 years, this government now owns all the Victorian problems and must account to the electorate for not fixing them.

The political risk was summarized in an editorial in The Age on 30 November 2009

“In September, a Senate report into federal funding of public transport found Melbourne’s network was badly managed in comparison with Perth’s government-operated system. A key problem was lack of accountability: it was unclear who was in charge. The consequences of the lack of an overarching transit authority to oversee the whole system are clear…..

New operators of trains and trams in new livery will struggle to deliver acceptable service unless the Government makes good its past neglect of infrastructure.”

The fact that the Victorian rail system is being privately operated will not be an acceptable shield when the first passenger train crashes with a jam-packed peak hour cargo.

Kevin Jones

Finger injury causes hefty new safety agenda for John Holland Rail

Comcare has instigated a hefty list of enforceable undertakings (EU) against John Holland Rail (JHR) after a contractor, Jack Wilmot, needed a finger amputated after a workplace injury.

According to the report on the Comcare website

“…an apprentice boilermaker was involved in an incident which resulted in crush injuries to his left index finger at a JHR facility located at Kewdale, Western Australia.”

Comcare’s investigation report

“found that JHR failed to ensure the apprentice, had received adequate training, supervision and instructions in the task he was undertaking when injured.”

Stephen Sasse, Director of John Holland Rail, signed off on the enforceable undertaking at the end of August 2009.

Below are some of the mandatory safety improvements

maintain the new supervisory structure implemented at the Kewdale facility shortly after the incident

implement and adapt the safer systems of work across JHR workplaces within two months of signing the EU

conduct a risk assessment of all major activities undertaken by JHR to determine and identify those which should be classified as ‘high risk activities’ (HRAs) within six months of signing the EU

eliminate where reasonably practicable to do so, all HRAs and otherwise apply appropriate control measures to the balance of the HRAs, within six months of signing the EU

provide training regarding safer systems of work to all JHR employees who undertake rail plant maintenance activities as part of their duties within eight months of signing the EU

commence implementation of the Rail Safety Business Plan 2009 at all JHR workplaces by 31 September 2009 including commencing work on each of the 28 strategic initiatives within the stated timeframes.

Some of these tasks would be impossible to undertake from scratch. A response from John Holland Rail and/or John Holland Group is being sought.

Enforceable undertakings are a feature of financial and OHS legal processes. In Queensland and Victoria an EU is

“… a legal agreement in which a person or organisation undertakes to carry out specific activities to improve worker health and safety and deliver benefits to industry and the broader community.”

John Holland Group has been proud of its OHS record for many years and has had the benefit of Janet Holmes a Court as a safety champion within and outside the company. Holmes a Court spoke of her commitment to safety at the 2009 Safety In Action Conference which was hosted by the Safety Institute of Australia (SIA) of which John Holland is a Diamond Corporate Partner ($A25,000 minimum donation).

Only last week the SIA, proudly announced a Diamond Corporate Partnership with John Holland Group which commits the company to, amongst other commitments,

“Act and work responsibly and competently at all times to improve health and safety in workplaces and ensure they do no harm.

Give priority to the health, safety and welfare of employees, employers and other workplace health and safety stakeholders in accordance with accepted standards of moral and legal behaviour during the performance of their duties.

Ensure the health, safety and welfare of employees, employers and other workplace health and safety stakeholders takes precedence over the professional member’s responsibility to sectional or private interests.

Ensure work by people under their direction is competently performed and honestly and reliably reported.

Ensure they do not engage in any illegal or improper practices.”

It is suggested that for next year’s Safety In Action Conference, the SIA asks a JHG representative to discuss the above enforceable undertakings as a case study of inadequate safety management and the related organisational and financial costs.

Kevin Jones

[Note: Kevin Jones was involved in the promotion of Safety In Action 2009]

Level crossings and safety management

Regular readers will know that SafetyAWorkBlog believes that there is little justification for road/rail crossings, particularly in metropolitan areas, and that grade separation should be the aim of any crossing upgrades. Too often governments dismiss grade separation without serious consideration because it is usually the most expensive control option. Regardless of expense, elimination of hazards must be considered in public safety policy and OHS. It is only after the elimination of a hazard is seriously considered that lower order control measures are seen to be valid.

At the moment in Victoria, there is community outrage because the truck driver involved in the deaths of 11 train passengers at a level crossing at Kerang has been cleared of any legal responsibility for the deaths. Several relatives of victims are pursuing civil action against the driver, Mr Christiaan Scholl.

The wisdom of civil action against the driver is debatable as any potential financial “win” will come from the insurance pockets of the Transport Accident Commission and not Mr Scholl. Compensation may be gained but any hope that the action could be seen as a “penalty” is false.

The Kerang rail crossing illustrates some basic OHS issues:

Worker responsibility

The Kerang level crossing had design deficiencies that had repeatedly identified by a number of government authorities, local companies and the public. The court case heard that the crossing was known to be dangerous.

In OHS, known hazards are controlled in a number of ways. Clearly the rail and road traffic was not separated and engineering controls were not introduced at the time of the incident. The owners of the crossing (and this is debated also) determined that signage was appropriate (or even perhaps “as far as is reasonably practicable”?).

Clearly signage was not adequate but there is also the issue of driver (worker) responsibility. It was mentioned in court and repeatedly in the media that the level crossing was known to be dangerous. Why then, would drivers continue to treat the crossing as if it was not? The legal speed limits remained at 100kph, at the time of the incident. The road laws clearly state that road traffic must give way to rail traffic and yet drivers have admitted to complacency.

This is perhaps the source of a lot of the community outrage in relation to the Kerang incident. The findings in favour of the driver place all the responsibility for the incident on the inadequate design of the crossing.

Working environment

As employers have responsibility to ensure a safe and health work environment, so government has a social and legal obligation to make public areas safe. Victorian governments for decades have neglected the hazards presented by inadequately designed or controlled level crossings. Governments must take responsibility for inaction just as much as taking credit for action and infrastructure improvements.

Infrastructure spending had started to increase prior to the incident but the need was sharply illustrated through the unnecessary deaths of 11 rail passengers. Many Australian governments are spending millions of dollars on rail/road crossing upgrades as a result of the Kerang incident.

Road Safety and OHS

Many OHS professionals illustrate OHS by drawing on road safety. The correlation is very poor but the attempt is understandable – most people drive, they drive within strict laws that were learnt in training (induction), and the road laws are enforced by an external body (police = WorkSafe. However, this relationship has no corresponding role for employers, who have a workplace responsibility. The road user has a direct relationship with the regulator. In OHS the role of the employer is crucial.

Perhaps the Kerang incident and other level crossing incidents could be used in brainstorming to illustrate personal accountability, employer accountability and government responsibility. It would be a worthwhile exercise to discuss whether road safety and workplace safety could share as many educative elements as some of the advocates suggest.

As with most posts on SafetyAtWorkBlog, these thoughts are a work-in-progress and debate and commentary are welcome.

Kevin Jones

Note: SafetyAtWorkBlog is not privy to any of the court evidence and must rely on media reports. More information will be presented when available.

Category: railroad

Mining company trial set over cyclone deaths

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Fortescue Metals contests cyclone deaths

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Government can do much better on level crossing safety

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Level crossing investigation reports

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Big fine for Queensland Rail – big risks in rail

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Finger injury causes hefty new safety agenda for John Holland Rail

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Level crossings and safety management

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