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Is there a Mars safety and a Venus safety?

A research paper released last month in Germany caught my attention even though it does not relate directly to research undertaken in a work environment.

There seems to be an established train of thought that men and women choose to take risks based on some sort of gender criteria.

Alison L. Booth and Patrick J. Nolen have published “Gender Differences in Risk Behaviour: Does Nurture Matter?” They researched risk behaviour along gender lines in secondary education, a different sample choice to other researchers who mostly looked at their university students. Booth and Nolen found

“…gender differences in preferences for risk-taking are sensitive to the gender mix of the experimental group, with girls being more likely to choose risky outcomes when assigned to all-girl groups. This suggests that observed gender differences in behaviour under uncertainty found in previous studies might reflect social learning rather than inherent gender traits.”

Gender studies are fraught with ideological baggage and it is a brave person who chooses this line of study, as I learnt through studying sociology and Russian literature at university (but that’s another story).

The full report is heavy going for those with no sociology background but the research flags an issue that could be useful to pose to the growing band of workplace psychologists and culture gurus – what are the gender-based variations in unsafe behaviours in the workplace?

Could the available research mean different safety management approaches in workplaces with different gender mixes?

When people talk about workplace culture, could there be a male culture and a female culture? (We certainly refer to a macho culture in some industries) In other words, is there a Mars safety and a Venus safety?

Workplace safety tries hard to be generic but has variations based on industry types. Perhaps we should be looking more closely at the demographics of these types and varying our safety management approaches?

Kevin Jones

Two different approaches to risk management and safety in Australia

Australian Standards can have a major role to play in the management of safety in workplaces. They apply to equipment, documents, decisions and can have legislative credibility if required by specific regulations. Australian Standards are regularly referred to in guidances issued by OHS regulators adding further credibility. The highest selling standard for many years has been Risk Management.

Unreasonable safety costs

One of SafetyAtWorkBlog’s long-held peeves needs to be stated here. The standards are produced by a private company, Standards Australia. The standards are only available for sale. Small business, in particular, often baulks at OHS improvements because they see OHS management as a large cost for a small return, in a risk management context. But the standards they need to satisfy regulatory compliance can only to be purchased.

If the Australian government is serious about easing the cost of regulatory compliance, make any Australian Standard that is mentioned in legislation available for free.

But government’s are only interested in reducing indirect OHS costs through paperwork and “red tape”, and OHS compliance requires some level of documentation.

Risk Management

Two important OHS documents that discuss risk management were released within weeks of each other. First the Australian government released the second and final report of the Review into National Model OHS Laws (OHS Report). The other report was the findings of the Tasmanian Coroner into the death of Larry Knight.

The Coroner’s report was highly critical of the Beaconsfield mine’s (BGM) risk management process.

“BGM submits that there has been adequate documentation of its risk management…… I do not accept BGM’s submission” (pages 68-69)

The Coroner goes on to say

“…., the evidence is unclear upon the steps taken by BGM, prior to this decision, in its evaluation of those risks identified by its own risk analysis process. To illustrate:

There is no evidence to explain the decision to resume mining in contradiction of Mr Gill’s memorandum which had stipulated that forward modelling be completed beforehand.

Mr Gill had, in his memorandum posed the questions, “Are our current ground support standards sufficient for the seismicity being experienced?, and if they aren’t, “What is required?” However, there is not any evidence of BGM having undertaking an assessment of the sufficiency of its ground support standards so that these questions could be answered nor is there any record evidencing why the decision was taken to resume mining without these questions being addressed.

Dr Sharrock had identified an important depth of failure issue which Mr Gill acknowledged was raised by him at his close-out meeting yet there is no evidence to explain the evaluation of this concern by BGM and the basis for its rejection.

There does not appear to be any evidence of BMG having considered the reevaluation of its ground support after Mr Basson’s modelling results became available although this had been advised by Mr Turner.” (pages 66-67, my emphasis)

The coroner’s report is full of this type of comment of an inadequate risk management and assessment process.

Reading the report in full generates a big question of how can a company be so deficient in its safety management system and still not be held responsible for the consequences of its actions?

The company remains belligerent in its defence of the very risk assessment process that the Coroner slammed. In a media statement, CEO Bill Colvin states

“…the company is disappointed at the lack of acknowledgement of the extensive risk assessment process undertaken by the Beaconsfield Gold mine following the October 2005 rock fall.

“Contrary to comments made by the Coroner, there was rigorous risk assessment, the mine did vary its ground support system and it changed its mining method. Nevertheless, the Coroner did find that no person contributed to the death of Larry Knight.”

Which report was he reading?

Outside of the coronial process, there seems to be sufficient evidence in the coroner’s report for Workplace Standards Tasmania to have another look at prosecuting BGM for failing to ensure that Larry Knight had a healthy and safe work environment.

Review Panel – Risk Management

The Review Panel decided not to include risk management as an enforceable element of national OHS legislation, even though it is a legislative requirement in Queensland. The panel has reduced the emphasis on risk management by including it only “as part of an object of the model Act.” (page xviii)

Placing it as an object of the Act puts risk management out of the public’s eye. If risk management is not part of the obligations of an employer in law, we should not expect business operators to embrace them. The BGM risk management process was found to be deficient by the Coroner and may have contributed to the death of Larry Knight but the Review Panel sets risk management as an aim and not an enforceable part of model OHS legislation. It advocated the concept but would not committed

The panel heard, in a submission by Johnstone, Bluff and Quinlan, that

“The Model OHS Act should explicitly require duty holders to undertake systematic OHS management in order to comply with their general duty obligations, and the Act should outline the approach to be taken in a way that integrates the concept of ‘reasonably practicable’ into the process, and also shows how duty holders should use the provisions in regulations and codes of relevance to the issue being addressed in order to comply with the general duty.”

The Review Panel followed the recommendation of the Law Council of Australia that risk management be included in Regulations and not the Act itself.

But then, the review was not a review of occupational health and safety but of occupational health and safety law. The management of safety was never its focus.

If it had been such a review, or if the government decides that a “safety management review” is warranted in the next few years, there would have been the opportunity to analyse the cost of managing safety and to show how the legal fraternity and the standards setting processes unnecessarily contribute to high compliance costs and red tape.

Risk management was clearly an important business process at Beaconsfield Gold even if the application of the process was poor. The Coroner said

“one obvious line of defence is to have in place a systematic, comprehensive, rigorous and properly documented risk assessment process. It is my opinion that BGM did not abide by such a process in the period between the October ’05 rockfalls and Anzac Day 2006.” (page 71)

Larry Knight died on Anzac day 2006.

The Review Panel believes risk management can sit in Regulations and in legislative aims. Standards Australia continues to charge for its OHS and risk management standards. The Australian government remains silent on providing free business management information that has the real possibility of saving lives. Bring on the safety management review!

Kevin Jones

National OHS Review – initial comments

Several OHS colleagues on an international discussion forum have expressed some opinions on the final report of the Australia’s National Model OHS Law review.

Safety Alerts

One asked that better and more frequent safety alerts be published by the regulators and that those reports be based on fatalities, injuries and near misses.

There is an inconsistency of incident reporting in Australia. For instance, emergency service departments have different ways of notifying the media of incidents. Most rely on regular (multiple times each day) visits to their websites. This option doesn’t work unless one has tracking software or are doing nothing else. Several distribute email bulletins on a daily basis. Most of the bulletins deal with traffic incidents, floods or bushfires, but several also report on emergency incidents to individuals and, although not explicit, many occur in workplaces.

Incident alerts from emergency services are good because it is a service that OHS regulators and enforcers also receive and act upon.

For many years, various Australia safety organisations have published OHS solutions databases or, initially, folders. The maintenance of these have fluctuated over the years in relation to technological change and political interest. It is pointless trying to establish a fixed-point or hard-copy library when the Internet is now the primary resource tool.

It should be added that considerable information can be garnered from court reports of OHS prosecutions however, the Magistrates’ Courts do not provide publicly accessible court reports so any matters heard at that level are rarely reported, except by someone who is sitting in the court. To gain a proper understanding of the OHS legislative process, coverage of all levels of legal action should be encouraged.

Risk Management

Another colleague expressed concern about the use of “risk” throughout the report. Below is a section of the report that explains the review panel’s approach:

“In Chapter 30, we discuss the role of the risk management process in the model Act. As we noted in our first report, risk management is essential to achieving a safe and healthy work environment. We found that risk management is implicit in the definition of reasonably practicable, and as such, need not be expressly required to be applied as part of the qualifier of
the duties of care. Further, as we discuss in this report, risks can be successfully managed without mandating hazard identification and risk assessment in all cases, particularly where the hazards are well known and have universally accepted controls.

Therefore we recommend that the model Act should not include a specific process of hazard identification and risk assessment, or mandate a hierarchy of controls, but that the regulation-making power in the model Act should allow for the process to be established via regulation, with further guidance provided in a code of practice, as is contemporary practice.
The application of risk management process should however be encouraged…” (page xviii)

Throughout the review process the Victorian OHS Act was the most influential piece of legislation and that Act removed the previous requirement to assess workplace risks to determine the most appropriate control measure. WorkSafe Victoria had, for years, advocated in its publications and guidelines to “Find-Assess-Fix”. The “Assess” was dropped in many instances as the suitable control measure had been well-established just not widely applied.

The WorkSafe position was in response to those business operators who may say “I don’t care how hazardous the bloody thing is just fix it!” It was hoped that this would save time and “unnecessary” paperwork, and that other State jurisdictions would take the same approach. None did, and the removal of “Assess” confused businesses and safety professionals as it is a major inconsistency with the Australian Standard on Risk Management.

WorkSafe tried to calm the confusion by saying that they still though assessing risks was a good idea for many new and developing hazards, just that assessment could be done away with as a legislative requirements in most instances.

It seems like the National Review Panel supports the Victorian approach to risk assessment. Not so long ago, the New South Wales government subsidised a lot of training for farmers and others in the agricultural sector on risk assessment. Now it will have to re-explain.

The other concern with the panel’s approach to risk assessment is that it sees risk management as fitting within “reasonably practicable”, a concept that SafetyAtWorkBlog is not convinced helps in managing safety. “Reasonably practicable” is a concept that is defined and refined through prosecutions and court processes, therefore, it can change and it is best interpreted by lawyers. OHS legislation was designed to be readily understood by the layman for where the responsibility for safety sits with the employer and, to a lesser extent, the employee. As soon as law firms are brought into the process, information is locked away under lawyer-client privilege, the cost of safety skyrockets and any safety management lessons are delayed until the court case is heard (or not heard) years later.

It should be remembered that the National OHS Model Law was about the law relating to workplace safety not the implementation of safety management. It is this differentiation that needs to be constantly pushed to the government to avoid workplace safety becoming a management task that cannot be undertaken without a lawyer watching intently over one’s shoulder all the time.

Kevin Jones

John Bresland’s latest safety video

SafetyAtWorkBlog has previously referred to safety videos produced by the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB). The latest safety message from Chairman John Bresland relates to combustible dust explosion risks, a hazard that exists around the world and one that has been mentioned in this blog.

A curious element in this very good video is that he is lobbying the “incoming leadership at OSHA” to act on the CSB’s combustible gas recommendations. John’s video was released on 4 February 2009. The confirmation of a new Labor Secretary is still to occur and the latest nominee, Hilda Solis, has become embroiled in a taxation “scandal” relating to her husband’s auto repair business.

Bresland’s messages are always of good general safety relevance, a major reason why they are embedded in SafetyAtWorkBlog, but the latest one has some peculiar tones given the current US political circumstances. In Australia, we rarely have Chairman or CEOs of government agencies making such statements. It is indeed curious.

Kevin Jones

Eliminate the hazards

The first control measure on the “hierarchy of controls” is to eliminate the hazard. OHS consultants and professionals should always consider ways to achieve this. It may prove to be impractical, or politically unpopular, but it should always be discussed or recommended. Reports and submissions that do not consider this control measure can be considered invalid.

In late-January 2009, the organic farmers in Australia reminded the media that its farming members are developing a safer industry for the customer and the producer. This industry has boomed in Australia since the 1970’s in as a result of a desire and commitment to “eliminate the hazard”.

Interviews conducted by Biological Farmers of Australia (BFA) to help discover why producers ‘go organic’ reveal a high number of farmers consider the switch for the health of themselves and their families.

Rob Bauer (Bauers Organic Farm, Qld), one of Australia’s largest organic horticultural growers, says he turned to organic farming 27 ago after farmers in his area became ill with cancer.

He says he wanted to decrease health risks associated with synthetic farm chemicals.

“I started thinking about farming differently after growing up in the Lockyer Valley (Qld) where friends and family passed away in their fifties after years of intensive agrichemical production.”

He says neurological problems, tumours, and cancer were among the chronic diseases he watched take their toll on his local farming community.

“I wasn’t comfortable with producing food using harsh farm chemicals for consumers,” he says.

Steve Skopilianos, commercial lettuce producer from Ladybird Organics in Keilor (Vic) looked into organics when he started a family.

“We had been applying pesticide blends with no understanding of their effect on people and employees. There were times prior to organic conversion where I would not take my own produce home for my family to eat.”

Biodynamic producers of macadamias are happy to avoid high levels of agrichemicals typically used on the nuts.

“Working without a high exposure to synthetic chemical farm products is a weight off your mind,” says Marco Bobbert, from Wodonga Park Fruit and Nuts macadamia plantation (Qld), certified biodynamic since 1987.

He says direct chemical exposure could easily occur on conventional farms from accidents in production. “All it takes is a broken spray pipe.”

He says it is not just organic farmers who are concerned – “All farmers try to minimise their contact with chemicals on-farm. But organic production actively works toward negating that risk”.

Research has shown there is good reason for producers’ concern – a high exposure to some farm chemicals can lead to major health problems.

Particularly problematic substances include organophosphate insecticides and pesticides, which have been connected to several types of cancer, sterility and cognitive deficits (1).

The agrichemical endosulfan is one example of a highly toxic organochlorine cyclodiene) insecticide still in use in Australia.

1. (1) Ciesielski, S, Loomis, D, Rupp Mims, S, Auer, A, Pesticide Exposures, Cholinesterase Depression, and Symptoms among North Carolina Migrant Farmworkers; American Journal of Public Health, 1994.

Cass Sunstein, Risk, Cost-Benefit and OHS – Part 2

Part 2 of Risk & Reason book review from SafetyAtWork magazine 2003

Sunstein closes the chapter “Thinking About Risks” with a short reference to September 11 2001 with which he says that “acts of terrorism show an acute appreciation of the psychological phenomena..”

Throughout the book, there are snippets that can be related to safety management. For instance, he writes of “dreaded deaths” with 3 points:

People can adapt to suffering much better than they think they can.
Some pain and suffering may well be an inevitable part of a desirable period in which people…can plan and adapt themselves to the fact of death…(p.66)
The period of pain and suffering that precedes death ought… to be far less important… than the fact of death itself.”

These points relate to HIV and cancer principally, but can’t we obtain some constructive advantage from having our employees dread workplace or traumatic deaths? First aid training often raises safety awareness because the First Aiders dread having to apply their skills. We drive cautiously because we dread traumatic injuries to our family and ourselves. Dread can lead to caution which leads to safe work.

Sunstein chooses not to deal with the relationship between risk and culture and directs us to “Risk & Culture” by Douglas and Wildavsky (1992). It is fair to acknowledge intellectual limitations but the whole book operates through, predominantly, the concerns of the United States culture and values. The cultural values of the US are not universal and some admission of this variation would have been useful, particularly given that the Douglas and Wildavsky book was published well over 10 years ago.

The illustration of eight propositions for cost-benefit analysis and government decision-making is very useful. They support the integration of qualitative measurements and a broad application of “costs”. One proposition is that “agencies should be required to show that the benefits justify the costs. If they do not, they should be required to show that the action is nonetheless reasonable…” Accountability is now an essential element of all business areas.

Risk and Reason may prove to be invaluable to United States readers but information for others was difficult to extract. (The testimonials on the dust jacket are glowing but are all academic, although one is from outside the US). There is no obligation for writers to include readers outside of their own marketplace but on an issue like risk and in a context of environmental management, it is disappointing that the book does not acknowledge the global readership. As mentioned above even very well known risk experts are not even referenced. The book is parochial and does not acknowledge that international standards do affect the US legal system even if it is less than in other jurisdictions. Environmental issues cross territorial boundaries and are becoming more involved with global legal structures and obligations.

Cass Sunstein has a good writing style and it is not difficult to read. We can only hope that the publishers encourage Mr Sunstein to write a complementary book focussing on risk and reason outside the United States.

The best pathway to Cass Sunstein information and writings is through his listing at Wikipedia. However, I did enjoy reading this article.

Cass Sunstein, Risk, Cost-Benefit and OHS

On 26 January 2009, the Los Angeles Times reported on the appointment of Cass Sunstein as the “regulatory czar” under Barack Obama’s presidency. He is to be appointed the head of The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.

In 2003 in the precursor to the SafetyAtWorkBlog, SafetyAtWork magazine, I reviewed Sunstein’s book – Risk & Reason, Safety, Law and the Environment. Below is the first part of that review

SafetyAtWork magazine Vol 4 Issue 11 - 2003

So many safety professionals also have responsibility for the environment that Risk & Reason – Safety, Law, and the Environment seemed an attractive read. This book is unashamedly North American and to some extent that is a discouragement but given that many innovations originated there, the book was worth a look.

From outside North America the issues of most relevance were those concerning risk perception and the role of experts. Cass Sunstein states that

Before government acts, it should, if feasible, attempt to produce a cost benefit analysis, understood as a detailed accounting of the consequences of the alternative courses of action. The cost benefit analysis should allow people to see if the problem at issue is small or large. It should explore the expense of reducing the problem and explain who will bear that expense. (p. ix)

He says that,

Some people think of cost benefit analysis as a form of cold, barely human calculation, treating health and life as mere commodities and envisioning government as some kind of huge maximizing machine. On the contrary, I urge that cost-benefit analysis should be seen as a simple pragmatic tool, designed to promote a better appreciation of the consequences of regulation. (p.ix)

I wondered whether what he considers cost -benefit analysis in the broadest sense. His concepts fit with risk management and, of course, risk management is supported by various standards such as AS4360.

The trap with cost-benefit analysis is that decisions made are cold and barely human, which he acknowledges. He uses the fuel economy standard as an example.

If, for example, proposed fuel economy standards will significantly reduce greenhouse gases but also lead to smaller and less safe cars -and thus produce over a thousand extra deaths each year – officials and citizens should be aware of that fact. (P. ix)

Here is a crucial question for the book – what is the more important, the needs of the many, or the needs of the few. In his introduction, he surprisingly uses an example of the Hatfield rail crash in the United Kingdom. Sunstein discusses how people now perceive rail transport as unsafe and began driving to work, a far more statistically dangerous activity. This example is proceeding well until he stumbles. He says that

After the crash, people undoubtedly spoke with one another about their fears, creating a kind of cascade of concern about train safety. We shall also see that cascade effects can lead people to large-scale errors about risks. But government regulation, my principal topic here, was not involved. (p 2)

It is clear that Sunstein is not as well informed on Hatfield as is necessary to use the example. Government regulation, or deregulation, of rail transport has never sat well with the English rail traveller. Hatfield confirmed fears encouraging people to alternative transport methods, ones over which they have direct control. With train travel, you place your trust in the driver and the system. In automobiles, you feel in more control.

Sunstein makes three recommendations to government on assessing regulation through cost-benefit analysis:

“…attempt to assess the magnitude of any problem that it is attempting to solve, through quantitative assessments to the extent possible.”
“…attempt to assess tradeoffs, by exploring the costs of regulation, also in quantitative terms if possible.”
” attempt to use tools that are effective and inexpensive.” (p.5)

This process would be familiar to all safety professionals. We recommend the same process to improve safety:

Identify
Assess
Control

This book shows that there are many parallels between environmental regulation and OHS regulation. Sunstein says

“Properly understood, a cost-benefit state attempts to make people’s lives better. The effort to quantify and to balance is designed not to assess everything in terms of money but to promote close attention to the actual consequences of what government does.” (p.8 )

Chapter 2 is very much about risk perception but suffers from not drawing more on the large amount of safety risk perception analysis and terminology. Sunstein reaches the issue of risk perception from a different point of origin. He asks,

‘What are ordinary people thinking? Can we discern some structure to their judgments? Three beliefs seem to be playing a large role. First, many people believe that risk is an “all or nothing” matter. Something is either safe or dangerous, and there is no middle ground. Second, many people are committed to a belief in the benevolence of nature. They think that the products of human beings, and human activities, are more likely to be dangerous than the products of natural processes. Third, many people subscribe to the “zero risk” mentality, at least in some domains. Such people believe that it is both possible and appropriate to abolish risk entirely, a belief that appears closely connected with the notion that risk is a matter of “all or nothing.”‘ (p.36)

Sunstein discusses Outrage without naming it and by missing this concept narrows the relevance of the book and the authority of his voice. If he had looked at any of Peter Sandman’s work on Outrage, had looked to other scholarly fields, his work would have been more authoritative. Given that Sandman’s works originated from environmental and planning issues it is very surprising that there is no reference to them, particularly given that Sandman is also a United States academic.

Sunstein says that “a possible conclusion is that, with respect to risks, vivid images and concrete pictures of disaster can ‘crowd out’ other kinds of thoughts, including the crucial thought that the probability of disaster is very small.” (p.46) How much more interesting would it have been if he had incorporated Sandman’s Outrage principle and expanded upon it?

The next part of this review will be posted tomorrow.

Category: risk

Is there a Mars safety and a Venus safety?

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