standards – Page 15 – SafetyAtWorkBlog

Vision statements = hypocrisy (mostly)

I have experienced two situations recently which made me question the value of corporate mission statements.

Recently the CEO of an Australian company spoke about how safety was a core value and how committed to safety she was. She is a recognised leader in safety and directly involves herself in safety management and meetings. However, her employees in the audience were shaking their heads because the safety culture she espoused was not as widespread through the company structure as she believed.

The other situation was a staff meeting I attended with a regional CEO and International CEO where they were unaware that employees in regional offices and undertaking shiftwork had not been integrated into the corporation. In fact the shiftworkers had not been informed of the CEO visits until the last minute. The company has “integration” as a corporate value.

Leadership (a most dubiously-applied concept in my mind) and vision statements may “come from the top” but they do not flow by themselves to the four corners of a company. They must be worked on, almost as a full time mission.

Vision statements have been promoted in so many corporations that have fallen over through mismanagement that statements have become a bit of a joke, in most circumstances. Nothing kills motivation quicker than hypocrisy.

(This also occurs in organisations that begin a program of corporate restructure and positioning, and the first item on the agenda is a “sexy new logo.)

It is important to remember that Enron’s motto was “Respect, Integrity, Communication and Excellence.” If one thinks that Enron is an unfair corporate example, look at one’s own company statement and seriously ask yourself whether all elements of the company are operating to those standards. Perhaps, someone needs to provide corporate morality audits.

Lastly, any vision statement must accept and mention that the principal aim of any company is to make money (a fact I learnt from Peter Sandman). To omit this reality immediately shows that the statement is not grounded and is simply management spin.

Kevin Jones

Professor Quinlan outlines the roles and approaches of the OHS inspectorate

The Safety in Action conference is lucky to have Professor Michael Quinlan as a keynote speaker, as he has seriously curtailed his conference appearances to favour those that benefit the safety profession over the commercial conferences. His, and Richard Johnstone’s, research on 1200 inspectors has provided useful insight into the effectiveness and roles of OHS inspectors. The project also interviewed HSRs and employers and visited a large variety of workplaces.

Michael Quinlan at Safety In Action Conference

Inspectorate activity focused on in the report was in the traditional areas initially. But although statistics overstate the effectiveness of the visits, the bulk of their activity relates to targeted strategies, as targeted enforcement provides a greater return. This may be important to remember when listening to presentations from the regulators about their performance indicators.

Less than half of an inspector’s time is spent in talking with workers. Most attention was on plant and documentation was low except in major hazard sites. Inspectors don’t ask about the participatory structures which Quinlan sees as a major deficiency.

Inspectors currently have much better communication skills than in previous incarnations.

In 50% of the cases studied there is no action taken by inspectors, 25% are verbal instructions, improvement notices issued in 34%.

The research also asked what standards were referred to by the inspectors with the most common being process or performance standards. Inspectors are very hesitant in providing advice on potential solutions yet they are often the best placed to provide advice.

Inspectorate training has greatly improved and inspectors do apply their enforcement skills selectively. Some employers want notices in order to gain the attention on safety matters from the executives.

“Zero Harm” often fades to zero injuries and becomes implemented more restrictively than intended due to the realisation of the workload in achieving the corporate goals.

Inspectors are more cynical on audit tools because the tools in many cases have become checklist compliances with insufficient resources to improve safety in reality.

Inspectors struggle with psychosocial issues but the general opinion is that managing the issues will evolve in a similar way to that of manual handling over the last 20 years. Often bullying cases can take up a lot of inspector’s time with less than perfect outcomes.

Inspectors are beginning to see safety within the business/management context and provide more assistance with managers. Inspectors are very aware of the risks associated with paper compliance management systems.

Inspectors don’t interact sufficiently with unions and HSRs. Well-managed worksites are prepared to include a second opinion on safety, often from unions. Those sites that are not inclusive should raise a red flag.

Repeat visits by inspectors are the most effective technique in safety improvement but under-resourcing hampers this technique.

Kevin Jones

OHS and Corporate Responsibility in Asia

In 2000, Melody Kemp was interviewed for Safety At Work magazine about her experience monitoring Western corporations’ workplace safety in Asia. Below is an extract of that interview.

The full interview is available by clicking the HERE. pages-from-2i5-melody-kemp-interview

Recently you were part of an international OHS inspection team in Indonesia. Can you tell us about that?

I guess the reason I became part of the team was that I was known to the social research group that we were working with. First, Reebok, who we were working for, put the job out for tender, which was actually quite unusual. Normally the other shoe companies tend to elect an international consulting accounting firm like Price Waterhouse or Ernst Young.

The woman who took over the human rights job used to work for the Asian Foundation and she had a totally different set of beliefs. She had a background in social activism and human rights, so she was interested in a different approach. Being as independent as they could be they decided to take this opportunity. They subcontracted to a prominent social research group who have worked for World Bank and have a lot of status.

Also, they were all Indonesians while I was the only foreigner on the team but I also speak Indonesian. A major factor was that we were all familiar with the language and culture. They needed an OHS person, they preferred to work with a woman, and I was the only woman they could find in Indonesia with that mix of skills.

Nanotechnology safety campaign (with Interview)

On 18 March 2009, Steve Mullins the OHS Officer with the Australian Council of Trade Unions presented a paper on nanotechnology hazards to the “Science Meets Parliament” forum. His concerns over worker safety are not shared by the nanotechnology industry as media reports show but, as Steve points out, nanotechnology hazards have some interesting parallels with asbestos.

Below are the concerns that Steve has over the nanotechnology manufacturing industry in Australia:

No regulatory acceptance that nanomaterials are more hazardous

No nano specific risk assessment or controls mandated

No nano specific monitoring equipment

No nano specific MSDS

No exposure levels

No labels

No requirement to inform

No health surveillance

No training

No nano specific PPE

Where nano specific risk management applied or promoted, end up trying to apply controls designed for larger material anyway

There is no coordinated approach

An exclusive interview with Steve is available by clicking HERE.

Amanda Barnard

In 2008 Australian theoretical physicist Amanda Barnard was awarded the L’Oréal Australia For Women in Science Fellowship. Barnard is developing computational tools to predict the behaviour of nanoparticles in the environment.

An video report about Amanda Branard is below.

Air Safety Culture – Turkish Style

SafetyAtWorkBlog would not purport to be knowledgeable about airlines, Turkish or Australia but there was a fascinating article published in Europe on 12 March 2009 that discusses the safety culture in Turkish Airlines. The article is entitled “Islam and the art of aircraft maintenance” by Claire Berlinski

There are some similarities to the current issues running in Australian media and industrial circles over the maintenance services of Qantas aircraft.

The crash of a Turkish Airline flight in Amsterdam on 25 February 2009 gained worldwide attention. According to Berlinski’s article this crash

“…was caused by mechanical failure, exacerbated by severe pilot error: The aircraft’s altimeter – which had malfunctioned twice in the past eight landings – was faulty, and the pilots failed to note this or respond appropriately.”

A spokesperson for the airline insisted that the quality of servicing was the equal of European airlines. (God help, airline passengers in Europe.)

Berlinski reported that

“Technicians were given maintenance tasks after two or three hours of training”

and that according to a reputable Turkish publication “Tempo Dergisi”, a technician was interviewed who

“..claimed to be responsible for engine maintenance: he admitted that he was not licensed to do this job.”

Lastly she reports that

“And in December, 2006, it was widely reported that Turkish Airlines workers had sacrificed a camel on an Istanbul airport ramp as a gesture of thanks for having at last got rid of a batch of troublesome planes.”

There is much more in Berlinski’s article of concern and the full article is recommended but the relevance to SafetyAtWorkBlog is its example of a dysfunctional safety culture in an industry that is used as a positive example throughout the world, principally, as a result of James Reason’s work.

There will be good and bad in every industry and one will always be able to find a poor example of safety management in some country somewhere but the airline industry is different. It projects itself as well-regulated and operates to international benchmarks of efficiency and safety. It promotes its maintenance industry as “world’s best practice” but the generalisation is as empty as all generalisations.

OHS professionals are taught to manage safety in a way that includes the lowest common denominator in the workplace. Safety is built around the highest risk or the stupidest act.

It is useful to read the Berlinski as an article that reflects the infamous Darwin Awards except that the victim is not only the pilot but hundreds of innocent passengers.

Kevin Jones

Two different approaches to risk management and safety in Australia

Australian Standards can have a major role to play in the management of safety in workplaces. They apply to equipment, documents, decisions and can have legislative credibility if required by specific regulations. Australian Standards are regularly referred to in guidances issued by OHS regulators adding further credibility. The highest selling standard for many years has been Risk Management.

Unreasonable safety costs

One of SafetyAtWorkBlog’s long-held peeves needs to be stated here. The standards are produced by a private company, Standards Australia. The standards are only available for sale. Small business, in particular, often baulks at OHS improvements because they see OHS management as a large cost for a small return, in a risk management context. But the standards they need to satisfy regulatory compliance can only to be purchased.

If the Australian government is serious about easing the cost of regulatory compliance, make any Australian Standard that is mentioned in legislation available for free.

But government’s are only interested in reducing indirect OHS costs through paperwork and “red tape”, and OHS compliance requires some level of documentation.

Risk Management

Two important OHS documents that discuss risk management were released within weeks of each other. First the Australian government released the second and final report of the Review into National Model OHS Laws (OHS Report). The other report was the findings of the Tasmanian Coroner into the death of Larry Knight.

The Coroner’s report was highly critical of the Beaconsfield mine’s (BGM) risk management process.

“BGM submits that there has been adequate documentation of its risk management…… I do not accept BGM’s submission” (pages 68-69)

The Coroner goes on to say

“…., the evidence is unclear upon the steps taken by BGM, prior to this decision, in its evaluation of those risks identified by its own risk analysis process. To illustrate:

There is no evidence to explain the decision to resume mining in contradiction of Mr Gill’s memorandum which had stipulated that forward modelling be completed beforehand.

Mr Gill had, in his memorandum posed the questions, “Are our current ground support standards sufficient for the seismicity being experienced?, and if they aren’t, “What is required?” However, there is not any evidence of BGM having undertaking an assessment of the sufficiency of its ground support standards so that these questions could be answered nor is there any record evidencing why the decision was taken to resume mining without these questions being addressed.

Dr Sharrock had identified an important depth of failure issue which Mr Gill acknowledged was raised by him at his close-out meeting yet there is no evidence to explain the evaluation of this concern by BGM and the basis for its rejection.

There does not appear to be any evidence of BMG having considered the reevaluation of its ground support after Mr Basson’s modelling results became available although this had been advised by Mr Turner.” (pages 66-67, my emphasis)

The coroner’s report is full of this type of comment of an inadequate risk management and assessment process.

Reading the report in full generates a big question of how can a company be so deficient in its safety management system and still not be held responsible for the consequences of its actions?

The company remains belligerent in its defence of the very risk assessment process that the Coroner slammed. In a media statement, CEO Bill Colvin states

“…the company is disappointed at the lack of acknowledgement of the extensive risk assessment process undertaken by the Beaconsfield Gold mine following the October 2005 rock fall.

“Contrary to comments made by the Coroner, there was rigorous risk assessment, the mine did vary its ground support system and it changed its mining method. Nevertheless, the Coroner did find that no person contributed to the death of Larry Knight.”

Which report was he reading?

Outside of the coronial process, there seems to be sufficient evidence in the coroner’s report for Workplace Standards Tasmania to have another look at prosecuting BGM for failing to ensure that Larry Knight had a healthy and safe work environment.

Review Panel – Risk Management

The Review Panel decided not to include risk management as an enforceable element of national OHS legislation, even though it is a legislative requirement in Queensland. The panel has reduced the emphasis on risk management by including it only “as part of an object of the model Act.” (page xviii)

Placing it as an object of the Act puts risk management out of the public’s eye. If risk management is not part of the obligations of an employer in law, we should not expect business operators to embrace them. The BGM risk management process was found to be deficient by the Coroner and may have contributed to the death of Larry Knight but the Review Panel sets risk management as an aim and not an enforceable part of model OHS legislation. It advocated the concept but would not committed

The panel heard, in a submission by Johnstone, Bluff and Quinlan, that

“The Model OHS Act should explicitly require duty holders to undertake systematic OHS management in order to comply with their general duty obligations, and the Act should outline the approach to be taken in a way that integrates the concept of ‘reasonably practicable’ into the process, and also shows how duty holders should use the provisions in regulations and codes of relevance to the issue being addressed in order to comply with the general duty.”

The Review Panel followed the recommendation of the Law Council of Australia that risk management be included in Regulations and not the Act itself.

But then, the review was not a review of occupational health and safety but of occupational health and safety law. The management of safety was never its focus.

If it had been such a review, or if the government decides that a “safety management review” is warranted in the next few years, there would have been the opportunity to analyse the cost of managing safety and to show how the legal fraternity and the standards setting processes unnecessarily contribute to high compliance costs and red tape.

Risk management was clearly an important business process at Beaconsfield Gold even if the application of the process was poor. The Coroner said

“one obvious line of defence is to have in place a systematic, comprehensive, rigorous and properly documented risk assessment process. It is my opinion that BGM did not abide by such a process in the period between the October ’05 rockfalls and Anzac Day 2006.” (page 71)

Larry Knight died on Anzac day 2006.

The Review Panel believes risk management can sit in Regulations and in legislative aims. Standards Australia continues to charge for its OHS and risk management standards. The Australian government remains silent on providing free business management information that has the real possibility of saving lives. Bring on the safety management review!

Kevin Jones

Beaconsfield Coroners report update

There have been several media reports of the disappointment in the findings felt by Larry Knight’s family but little else in the media, particularly over the weekend when some retrospection could have been expected.

However, the Tasmanian workplace relations minister, Lisa Singh, issued a statement last week. The most significant parts of the statement are

“I was pleased that the coroner Mr Rod Chandler noted in his report that the inspectorate was adequately staffed,” Ms Singh said. “I accept his criticism that at the time of the rock fall that killed Mr Knight, Workplace Standards was not sufficiently resourced to handle some issues of mine safety. That has now been rectified.

“I am seeking further advice on his recommendation that an audit of the office be undertaken each year to ensure that it is properly fulfilling its statutory duties.”

According to a statement from the law firm Maurice Blackburn

“Maurice Blackburn Special counsel Kamal Farouque, who acted as Counsel for the Knight family and the AWU throughout the Coronial Inquest, said that Coroner Rod Chandler’s findings include several major criticisms including:

ground support at the mine was inadequate;

the mine failed to put in place a comprehensive, rigorous and properly documented risk assessment process; and

if a thorough and systematic risk assessment process had been conducted, the likelihood of Mr Knight’s death occurring would have been reduced, perhaps significantly.

“What is plain is that the Coroner has made findings that indicate safety deficiencies,” Mr. Farouque said.

“A lesson to be learned from Mr Knight’s tragic death is the critical importance of proper risk management practices to worker safety, particularly in the mining industry,” Mr. Chandler found.”

Now we wait to see who implements those lessons.

Kevin Jones

Category: standards

Vision statements = hypocrisy (mostly)

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Professor Quinlan outlines the roles and approaches of the OHS inspectorate

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OHS and Corporate Responsibility in Asia

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Nanotechnology safety campaign (with Interview)

Amanda Barnard

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Air Safety Culture – Turkish Style

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Two different approaches to risk management and safety in Australia

Unreasonable safety costs

Risk Management

Review Panel – Risk Management

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Beaconsfield Coroners report update

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Amanda Barnard

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Unreasonable safety costs

Risk Management

Review Panel – Risk Management

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