On 22 July 2008 the Tasmanian Coroner continued with his inquest into the death of Larry Knight at the Beaconsfield mine on 25 April 2006. Shortly after the start the legal team representing the mine walked out. Newspaper, radio and TV have covered this extraordinary development. Other reports in SafetyAtWorkBlog told of the lawyers’ attempts…
The Victorian Government’s investigation into level crossing safety is continuing. Yesterday the Parliamentary Committee on Road Safety ran a seminar on technological issues related to level crossings. Today (22 July 2008 ) I attended the morning session of a seminar on Fail-Safe technologies. The meat of today’s seminar was to be an open and frank…
Matthew Knott’s article in the Australian newspaper (21 July 2008 ) included telling comments from Barry Willis, a 64-year-old former maintenance worker at Amberley air force base. The article says
“workplace health and safety was non-existent: open cans of chemical sealant were stored in the refrigerators where the men kept their lunch.”
I have been critical of the military in the past as they are usually well-sourced on OHS and often speak proudly of their approach to safety. Yet just as with the BlackHawk Inquiry findings criticising the safety culture, Barry Willis saw no safety culture in the 1970s.
At the risk of sounding like an old grump, working in that decade was under a different set of cultural rules. Modern OHS legislation was being considered by most Western jurisdictions and industrial diseases were coming to the fore. In the early 1980’s I worked in industrial relations concerning award restructuring. One of the first elements to be restructured was allowances, many of them accurately described as “danger money” – removing roadkill, working at heights, confined spaces and a range of other hazards.
It can be argued that modern salary levels incorporate allowances for hazardous work but the issue of immediate compensation for a dirty or hazardous job, hopefully, has had its day.
Sadly, for people like Barry Willis, the consequences of a hazard, known or discounted, continue and the struggle for acknowledgement and compensation continues.
In mid-July 2008, the West Australian Liberal Party detailed leaked correspondence concerning the maintenance program at the Apache Energy facility at Varanus Island. In the letter from July 2007, the director of petroleum and major hazard facilities, Richard Craddock, said
“The Five-Year Integrity Review report does not objectively demonstrate that the … pipeline complies with the conditions of … licence PL17, the variations under PL17 and the primary technical standard AS2885.”
The letter identified several areas of attention – pipeline integrity, corrosion and safety management.
A spokesman for Energy Minister Fran Logan said the issues raised were about a mainland pipeline however he also said that the Department of Industrial Relations “did raise the issues that were raised with Apache.”
Economic forecasts by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry WA said the pipeline explosion on Varanus Island had lead to a $6.7 billion reduction in business production and a $2.4 billion negative impact on the general WA economy.
Other reports are emerging over interdepartmental disputes in the area of enforcement of pipelines.
Other reports on the Varanus Island explosion are available in this blog by search “Varanus” in the search field on this page.
A developing sticking point in the review of Australia’s OHS laws is the inclusion or otherwise of “reasonably practicable”. This is an important legal concept but less so for safety management. Safety management is an aim and legislative responsibility and compliance is ill-defined. “Reasonably practicable” was an acknowledgement of the difficulty in complying with a…
On 15 July 2008, the Australian government released the 2005-2006 Compendium of Workers’ Compensation Statistics Australia. I am pleasantly surprised that although the number of fatalities is never at an acceptable level the trend data is very positive in terms of safety management.
Some key findings and trends reported in the Compendium include:
- Preliminary data for 2005-06 shows there were 231 compensated fatalities, 93 per cent of which were men.
- Preliminary data for 2005-06 reports the transport and storage industry accounted for the largest number of fatalities (41), followed by construction (33) and manufacturing (28).
- Trend data results showed all industries experienced a fall in incidence rates of injury and disease between 1997-98 and 2004-05, with the greatest falls being in the priority industries of mining (45 per cent decrease), construction (27 per cent decrease), transport and storage (20 per cent decrease), agriculture, forestry and fishing (19 per cent decrease) and manufacturing (18 per cent decrease).
- Reflecting Australia’s ageing labour force, the proportion of claims for employees aged 45 years or more increased from 33 per cent in 1997-98 to 39 per cent in 2004-05.
Such decreases in these major industries should be applauded. Certainly the background to the statistics should be analysed for a proper consideration but the mining results are terrific given that the sector is booming in Australia with new mines opening frequently and is suffering a shortage of skilled labour. Colleagues of mine in that sector have been crowing about the improvements for some time and they seem to be supported by this compendium.
The data can be downloaded HERE
The Australian’s government’s report into the crash of a Blackhawk helicopter on the deck of the HMAS Kanimbla in November 2006, in which two defence personnel were killed, has been released by Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston.
According to media statements
“The principal and overarching finding of the Board of Inquiry was that the cause of the crash of Black Hawk 221 was pilot error by the aircraft captain,” Air Chief Marshal Houston said. “Justice Levine stated that the principal finding, however, could not be viewed in isolation nor blame attributed to a highly experienced and well-respected Black Hawk pilot.
“This accident was the regrettable result of a number of factors coming together which culminated in this tragic incident. There was a gradual adoption of approach profiles which, on occasions, exceeded the limits of the aircraft. Other factors included a ‘can do’ culture in the Squadron, inadequate supervision, the pressures of preparing for operations, the relocation of the Squadron and a high operational tempo.”
Amongst the control measures introduced following the Blackhawk 221crash and an earlier incident, the Army issued a new risk-management policy in October 2007. It provides “commanders with clear instructions on how to conduct risk management on operations and in training.”
Ultimately, good has come from the results of the Blackhawk crashes. The decision to release this report, provide audio of the press conference and considerable inquiry background, is commendable. However, as reflected in the Air Chief Marshal’s comments above, and expanded upon in the must-hear podcast (35Mb MP3), safety management standards had slipped over time. He is keen to emphasise that the crashes need to be seen in a broader organizational context, as any incident investigation should.
But, in my opinion, that broader context remains damning. The Defence Forces should, through their strict hierarchical system and regimented decision-making, be an exemplar of safety and risk management.
It is always the case that we should learn from our mistakes but it seems, as in the private sector, that those organizations with considerable safety resources who are best equipped to avoid problems continue to experience them.
With many workplace investigations the excuse for incidents that is frequently trotted out – poor safety culture – is becoming a term of reduced relevance. The failure of a safety culture is not an “act of God” although the phrase, safety culture, is being used in the same manner. It implies that there was only so much that could be done but it also indicates that prior to any incident not enough was done.
Safety improvements through hindsight have become the mainstay of contemporary management. If there is a stuff-up, acknowledge the fact and promise restitution. Don’t accept responsibility. Don’t admit liability. In fact, don’t mention the incident, only mention what improvements one intends to make.
The depressing part of a no-blame investigation is that it can feel so unsatisfying.