disaster – Page 10 – SafetyAtWorkBlog

Peter Sandman interview in the aftermath of 9/11

In November 2001, prominent risk communicator, Peter Sandman, examined the 9/11 attacks in a long article trying to clarify the impact and the context of the attacks. Shortly after the attacks I had the chance to interview Peter Sandman for the online magazine I was then publishing, safetyATWORK. Below is the text of that 2001 interview.

“SAW: As a resident of New Jersey and a risk communicator, what effect has the September 11 attacks had?

PS: I was very lucky. I live a sufficient distance away, that neither I nor anyone really close to me was lost. But lots of people close to people close to me were lost. Everybody in this part of the country is one or two steps removed from someone who died that day. But, professionally, I’m trying to think through, as I assume anybody in risk communication would be trying to think through what we can say to our countrymen and countrywomen about living in a dangerous world. This is obviously a situation where the outrage is entirely justified. The last thing I want to be doing is telling people they ought not to be outraged. But it’s also a situation where the hazard is serious. Most of my work is in either a high-outrage low-hazard situation, where the risk communication job is to reduce the outrage, calm people down; or a high-hazard low-outrage situation, where the job is to increase the outrage, get people to protect themselves. September 11 and its aftermath have to be described as high-hazard high-outrage. Neither paradigm works. And yet clearly the message to people has got to be you need to live your life. You need to take what precautions you can take and recognise that you’re not going to be completely safe and live your life anyway. You need to get on aeroplanes, and go to ball games. You need to go into big cities. I think in the months ahead people like me are going to be trying to figure out how to say that and say it honestly and honourably and credibly to a population that desperately needs to hear it and understand it. Continue reading “Peter Sandman interview in the aftermath of 9/11”

Transocean executives gain safety bonuses

News that Transocean are awarding their executives substantial safety bonuses has the internet aflame with outrage. Certainly it seems hard to justify the bonuses given after the death of 11 workers and the damage to the local environment, economy and community but the action will also affect safety management.

Safety management is increasingly relying on statistics to identify performance levels. Transocean’s actions illustrate that some statistics bear little relation to reality or, at least, the real-world context of its operations.

AFP quotes Transocean as reporting to the US Securities and Exchange Commission that:

“Notwithstanding the tragic loss of life in the Gulf of Mexico, we achieved an exemplary statistical safety record as measured by our total recordable incident rate and total potential severity rate” Continue reading “Transocean executives gain safety bonuses”

Operational Risk Management – a timeless book, sadly

For several years now Mark Abkowitz’s book “Operational Risk Management” has been sitting on my “to-read” shelf. Given my recent wish for a case study approach to leadership and given the Fukushima nuclear issues, the book caught my attention.

Books that analyse disasters are far superior to watching real-time disasters because the distress is minimised, the analysis can be dispassionate and time can provide a more detailed context. (The quickness of production of some of the books about the BP/Gulf of Mexico suffered from the curse of topicality) Books provide a distance that the constant exposure to “disaster porn” does not.

Operational Risk Management looks at many at many disasters from the last 30 years but the disasters are not only industrial and process disasters, although Chernobyl and Bhopal are covered. Continue reading “Operational Risk Management – a timeless book, sadly”

Is capitalism anti-safety? Systemic failures in oil industry

The Wall Street Journal and other media around the world have reported on systemic failures of the global oil industry and government regulators identified by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. These articles are based on the release of a single chapter, Chapter 4, of the final report due for release on 11 January 2011.

A media release from the Commission includes the following findings from Chapter 4

“The well blew out because a number of separate risk factors, oversights, and outright mistakes combined to overwhelm the safeguards meant to prevent just such an event from happening. But most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single overarching failure—a failure of management. Better management by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the blowout by improving the ability of individuals involved to identify the risks they faced, and to properly evaluate, communicate, and address them.”

“. . .the Macondo blowout was the product of several individual missteps and oversights by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean, which government regulators lacked the authority, the necessary resources, and the technical expertise to prevent.”

“The blowout was not the product of a series of aberrational decisions made by rogue industry or government officials that could not have been anticipated or expected to occur again. Rather, the root causes are systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices and government policies, might well recur.”

“What we. . .know is considerable and significant:

each of the mistakes made on the rig and onshore by industry and government increased the risk of a well blowout;

the cumulative risk that resulted from these decisions and actions was both unreasonably large and avoidable; and

the risk of a catastrophic blowout was ultimately realized on April 20 and several of the mistakes were contributing causes of the blowout.”

The significance of these quotes is that the Commission is critical of an industry and not just a single company. Continue reading

Queensland safety magazine released

The Queensland Division of the Safety Institute of Australia regularly produces a newsletter/magazine of consistent quality and the November 2010 edition is available online.

This edition includes an article by Warwick Pearse on the Montara oil spill. Pearse did not have the luxury of access to the final reports or government’s response but he makes sound recommendations.

Kevin Jones

Montara oil spill report finally released

On 24 November 2010, the Australian Government finally released the investigation report into the 2009 Montara oil spill in the Timor Sea that has similarities to the oil rig explosion of BP in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.

The Energy & Resources Minister, Martin Ferguson, has sat on the report since the Board of Inquiry presented its findings in June 2010 even though there could have been industry-wide safety and design lessons. Significantly, the report was released after the recent Federal election and, according to the Minister’s media release, has found :

“At the heart of this matter is the failure of the operator and the failure of the regulator to adhere to this regime. Montara was preventable. If either – or preferably both – PTTEP AA or the Northern Territory Designated Authority had done their jobs properly and complied with requirements, the Montara Blowout would never have happened.”

For those readers in America and the Gulf of Mexico, these words may echo what they have heard only a few months ago.

The Government response supports the Report’s finding states:

“…that PTTEP AA’s widespread and systemic procedural shortcomings were a direct cause of the Montara incident. In addition, the Report identified concerns relating to the integrity of the remaining wells (H2, H3, H4 and GI) at the Montara Wellhead Platform. The Commissioner concluded that PTTEP AA did not achieve proper control of any of the five wells at the Montara oil field, and that PTTEP AA’s internal systems were insufficient to achieve a high quality of assurance in respect of well operations.” [link added] Continue reading “Montara oil spill report finally released”

BP releases internal Gulf disaster report

BP has released its internal inquiry report into the Deep Horizon oil rig disaster. The company has released an executive summary, the full report, a video and a press release. Not surprising there are multiple factors that combined to create the disaster but it is significant that BP stresses that ““multiple companies and work teams” contributed to the accident”. Clearly a major purpose of the media statements is to indicate that BP should carry the entire responsibility for the incident, a position it has consistently voiced.

The report requires a fair amount of analysis to identify the lessons and any lessons will need to be compared with any of the findings from the other investigations being undertaken. Also, BP has settled into its PR damage control process and careful analysis of the report and the media statements over the next few days in particular will provide much information on process safety, business continuity and media management.

Kevin Jones

Category: disaster

Peter Sandman interview in the aftermath of 9/11

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Transocean executives gain safety bonuses

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Operational Risk Management – a timeless book, sadly

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Is capitalism anti-safety? Systemic failures in oil industry

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Queensland safety magazine released

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Montara oil spill report finally released

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BP releases internal Gulf disaster report

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