Why won’t the Tasmanian government release the OHS report into the Beaconsfield mine collapse?

Since the 2006 rockfall at Beaconsfield Mine in Tasmania, the public has received limited information.  There have been books about the rescue of two workers and the Coroner’s inquest into the death of Larry Knight.  Greg Mellick undertook an investigation into the rockfall and found that noone was to blame for the rockfall.

Many workplace disasters have generated royal commissions in Australia.  The rockfall did not.  However, industry specialists, OHS professionals and others have established an expectation that investigations and reports into industrial disasters are publicly accessible.

The expectation is not unreasonable given that the OHS profession, legal profession, engineers and others operate within a belief that the analysis of disasters can provide ways of avoiding a recurrence.  Apparently the Tasmanian Government does not understand the significance of information in improving the safety of workers and the public in its State, even though its OHS and mine safety legislation is structured around prevention.

The Tasmanian Coroner released his findings into the death of Larry Knight.  The findings quoted extensively from the 400+ page OHS report from Professor Michael Quinlan that was part of Greg Mellick’s investigation process.  But the report itself is yet to be released.  Nor has the larger report undertaken by Greg Mellick.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has chosen not to lay charges over the rockfall.

The mine is back at full operation.

The survivors of the rockfall are rebuilding their lives.

Only a couple of weeks ago, the Legislative Council Select Committee on Mining Industry Regulation released its report into the State’s mining legislation.  The terms of reference have evolved from the findings of various investigations including Quinlan’s.  The committee was required to investigate

  1. Regulation and workplace standards within the mining and related industries in Tasmania.
  2. Safety performance of the Tasmanian mining industry compared to other primary industries in the State and the mining industry nationally.
  3. The role of Workplace Standards Tasmania in the regulation of the mining and associated industries.
  4. The efficacy and limitations of the co-regulatory model within the mining industry in Tasmania; and
  5. Any other matters incidental thereto.

On 2 April 2009 at the Safety In Action Conference in Melbourne, Professor Michael Quinlan expressed bewilderment at the decision to not release his investigation report.

SafetyAtWorkBlog contacted the OHS regulator in Tasmania asking for the Quinlan report.  We were advised that it was likely that the only way to obtain a copy was through Freedom of Information with the Department of Premier & Cabinet. (DPAC)  A representative of DPAC will contact us about the report’s status.

DPAC has a copy of the Mellick report.  The Australian Workers Union has a copy of the Mellick report.  SafetyAtWorkBlog believes there are leaked copies of the report in existence but for some reason, unknown at this time, the public is not permitted to see the report.

The Queensland government has available four reports into mining disasters in the Moura area with one report going back to 1972!!

In the years after the ESSO-Longford gas explosion, Professor Andrew Hopkins published “Lessons From Longford“.  It was for a long time the publisher’s best-selling book.  It is quoted extensively in the OHS and management professions.  Some of Andrew’s terminologies and concepts of safety culture have become ingrained in the psyche of OHS professionals in Australia.

It is hard to see any reason in April 2009 for the Mellick and Quinlan reports not be be publicly available.  Indeed there are many important professional and community reasons for the reports to be seen.

What is the professional legacy of the Tasmanian government’s investigations into the Beaconsfield Mine rockfall in 2004?

What will the government say when the next rockfall occurs in an underground mine?  What will the Premier or the Minister say to the next generation of widows or to the carers of the crippled miners?  Certainly David Bartlett or David Llewellyn cannot say that they did all they could to make workplaces safe.

Kevin Jones

Global pressures on Australian workers compensation schemes

Around 18 months ago the Victoria Government launched WorkHealth, a health prevention program that would be funded from the interest generated from the pool of workers compensation funds.  SafetyAtWorkBlog has previously questioned how the program will be funded when its income source is likely to have been severely reduced due to the global economic problems.

On 1 April 2009 WorkCover in South Australia reported a half-year net loss of $313 million. WorkCover CEO Julia Davison said in a media release that

“the global crisis is, as expected, taking its toll.  In the last six months stock markets have declined, investors have experienced significant losses, and interest rates have fallen significantly,” she said  “Like all investors, WorkCover has been hit hard by the global financial downturn.”

Earlier in March 2009, the Chair of the WorkSafe Board Elana Rubin said 

“the significant downturn on the world financial markets and reduction in interest rates had combined to drive a net loss of $1.42 billion for the half year.  Whilst interest rate reductions are good news for those of us with mortgages, they have the opposite effect on our scheme – in the half year to 31 December 2008, the unprecedented level of interest rate cuts negatively impacted our net result by $645 million.”

On 1 April 2009 SafetyAtWorkBlog asked John Merritt why WorkHealth was not mentioned as part of his keynote presentation at the Safety In Action Conference.  He reiterated the importance of the program in easing the recovery time, particularly, for manual handling injuries but acknowledged that the program’s funding source was based on interest

“from the [$600 million of the assets of the] workers compensation scheme over the next five years ….well there used to be interest from assets – there should be one day, there will be again –  around $40 million each year for the next five years will be invested in worker health.”

It is good to hear that the WorkHealth program is going to continue but the fragility of the program’s funding should have been evident in the planning phase.  Governments around the world are pulling back on government funded programs in a wide range of areas.  Ideas that seem good in the good times are now looking like luxuries.  It will be interesting to see if WorkHealth continues in the WorkCover area or moves to Health, where many of its critics have always said it belongs.

Kevin Jones

BHP Billiton deaths – government intervention

The West Australian government has taken the extraordinary step of talking directly to the senior management of Australian mining corporation BHP Billiton about the recent spate of fatalities at BHP’s worksites.  The cynic would say that we now know the number of workplace fatalities that it takes to gain a Minister’s attention however, the fact that this high-level meeting is occurring is a clear indication of the severity of the issue.  It may also indicate just how effective a union safety campaign can be.  It is just regrettable the campaign is generated from multiple fatalities rather than preventive issues.

According to the Minister, Nick Moore 

“Mines inspectors will now issue prohibition notices to BHP under the Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 – basically a stop work notice – for any breach of work practices or work place conditions that may constitute a hazard to workers.”

Mr Moore went on to say, according to one media article, “…the policy would remain in force until he had seen the report of a Section 45 review currently under way into safety management systems at all of BHP Billiton’s Pilbara iron ore mine sites.” 

The article noted that

“The review, requiring independent engineering studies of BHP worksites to be carried out, is expected to be completed by April 30.”

BHP, meanwhile, has given guarantees of the following safety improvements:

  •          Reduce site access;
  •          Improve contractor management;
  •          Enhance existing strategies to prevent excess working hours;
  •          Move rail operations from the Mine Safety and Inspection Act to the Rail Safety Act;
  •          Enhance traffic management standards, and;
  •          Suspend all non-essential work outside daylight hours

Kevin Jones

Professor Quinlan outlines the roles and approaches of the OHS inspectorate

The Safety in Action conference is lucky to have Professor Michael Quinlan as a keynote speaker, as he has seriously curtailed his conference appearances to favour those that benefit the safety profession over the commercial conferences.  His, and Richard Johnstone’s, research on 1200 inspectors has provided useful insight into the effectiveness and roles of OHS inspectors.  The project also interviewed HSRs and employers and visited a large variety of workplaces.

Michael Quinlan at Safety In Action Conference
Michael Quinlan at Safety In Action Conference

Inspectorate activity focused on in the report was in the traditional areas initially.  But although statistics overstate the effectiveness of the visits, the bulk of their activity relates to targeted strategies, as targeted enforcement provides a greater return.  This may be important to remember when listening to presentations from the regulators about their performance indicators.

Less than half of an inspector’s time is spent in talking with workers.  Most attention was on plant and documentation was low except in major hazard sites.  Inspectors don’t ask about the participatory structures which Quinlan sees as a major deficiency.

Inspectors currently have much better communication skills than in previous incarnations.

In 50% of the cases studied there is no action taken by inspectors, 25% are verbal instructions, improvement notices issued in 34%. 

The research also asked what standards were referred to by the inspectors with the most common being process or performance standards.  Inspectors are very hesitant in providing advice on potential solutions yet they are often the best placed to provide advice.

Inspectorate training has greatly improved and inspectors do apply their enforcement skills selectively.  Some employers want notices in order to gain the attention on safety matters from the executives.

“Zero Harm” often fades to zero injuries and becomes implemented more restrictively than intended due to the realisation of the workload in achieving  the corporate goals.

Inspectors are more cynical on audit tools because the tools in many cases have become checklist compliances with insufficient resources to improve safety in reality.

Inspectors struggle with psychosocial issues but the general opinion is that managing the issues will evolve in a similar way to that of manual handling over the last 20 years.  Often bullying cases can take up a lot of inspector’s time with less than perfect outcomes.

Inspectors are beginning to see safety within the business/management context and provide more assistance with managers.  Inspectors are very aware of the risks associated with paper compliance management systems.

Inspectors don’t interact sufficiently with unions and HSRs.  Well-managed worksites are prepared to include a second opinion on safety, often from unions.  Those sites that are not inclusive should raise a red flag.

Repeat visits by inspectors are the most effective technique in safety improvement but under-resourcing hampers this technique.

Kevin Jones

Mental Illness and Workplace Safety

Reports in the Australian media this week indicated that “nearly half the population has a common mental health problem at some point during their lives”.  Safety professionals and HR practitioners should take note of these statistics and hope that it does not manifest in their shift, even though it is likely.

The difficulty with trying to manage or anticipate mental health issues is that they seem to have evolved over time and multiplied.  There is the common phrase of “trying to herd cats” and it seems that mental health issues are the cats.  One could apply lateral thinking and propose the solution is to get a dog but will the dog herd a cat that doesn’t look like a cat, smell like a cat, or worst scenario of all, a cat that resembles a dog!

Because of the fluctuating psychiatric states of everyone everyday how does one recognise when a mood swing becomes a mental health issue.  Does one take everything as a mental health issue and waste time on frivolous matters?  Or is there no such thing as a frivolous matter?

In the one article there are these confusing and inconsistent terms for mental health:

  • “common mental health problem”
  • “mental condition”
  • “non psychotic psychiatric problems”
  • “mood disorder”
  • “anxiety disorder”
  • “mental health disorder”
  • “substance abuse or dependency”
  • “mental disorder”
  • “mental illness”
  • “psychiatric condition”

In this report it is unlikely that the synonyms have been generated by the journalist as the data quoted is from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, but it indicates the confusion that safety professionals can feel when they need to accommodate more recent workplace hazards – the psychosocial hazards.

The list above does not include the “established” hazards of bullying, occupational violence or stress.  The fact that there may be a clear differentiation between mental health symptoms and mental disorders but that needs to be clearly communicated to those who manage workplaces so that control resources can be allocated where best needed.

The article referred to above provides interesting statistics and there are gems of useful information in the ABS report but the article provides me with no clues about how to begin a coordinated program to address the mental health issues in the workplace.  It is an article without hope, without clues, without pathways on which the professional can act.

There is no doubt the psychosocial hazards at work are real but the advocates of intervention need to clarify the message.

Kevin Jones

(This blog posting does not discuss the recent changes to compensation for defence personnel and soldiers for mental health from combat, but mental health in that “industry” is a fascinating comparison to what occurs in the private sector.)

April 28 – Workers’ Memorial Day

memorial-poster-2009This annual event seems to receive more attention in Europe than elsewhere although over the years several Australian capital cities have erected workers’ memorial stones.  It is usually here that ceremonies occur.

I always attend these services in my own right as it helps to keep me grounded as I wade through risk assessments, policies, consultations, and other safety ephemera.

One of the chilling parts of the service is always the reading of those who have died over the previous twelve months.  This has echoes of the 9/11 recital each year but for the worker memorial there is a new set of names each year and a new set of families and a new round of grieving.

Please check your local town and city activities lists and attend this year’s event.

In support, the UK’s Hazards magazine has produced a simple but effective poster that can be downloaded.

Kevin Jones


What’s really causing the reduction of Australian injury rates?

Elsewhere in SafetyAtWorkBlog is a summary of the recent statistics released by the Australian Safety & Compensation Council.  Overall the injury trends are positive but it is worth looking at the report a little closer.

On page viii, the report says

Due to large increases in employment, incidence rates fell 16%, from 18 serious claims per 1000 employees in 2000–01 to 15 in 2005–06 and frequency rates fell 14% from 11 serious claims per million hours worked to 9.” [my emphasis]

The ASCC has identified this particular trend, the fall in incidence rates, to labour force variations, not necessarily due to any of the enforcement policies or marketing of the OHS regulators.

Australia is currently bemoaning the loss of manufacturing industry offshore, principally to south-east asia and China.  This will inevitably skew the workplace injury rates as with less heavy industry there is less work activity and less injuries.

There are all sorts of ways of measuring performance, of finding positive indicators, and indicators that are proportional are favoured – percentage reductions by specific industries, for instance.

All of this may look good for the OHS regulators and economic statisticians but those who glance over statistics for a general impression should consider that Australia is exporting a large part of its homegrown manufacturing industry.  The industry that we have from overseas, such as the automotive industry, is collapsing. (There are persistent rumours that, regardless of the US bailouts, General Motors, will disappear or have its Australian subsidiaries being nationalised by the Australian government.)

Australia is, in effect, exporting those industries with the highest long-term injury rates.  As the Compendium indicates (p.11) in 2007-8 the most hazardous industries remained agriculture and construction, industries that we cannot export.

National OHS Strategy

The ASCC figures differ from those used to measure the performance of the ten-year National OHS Strategy 2002-2012.  The strategy set a reduction target of 40% on figures for work-related injuries with a 20% reduction by June 2007.  The Compendium reports:

“Data from the recently released Comparative Performance Monitoring Report, 10th Edition shows that the 16% improvement recorded from the base period up to 2006–07 is below the rate of improvement required to meet the target of a 40% reduction by June 2012.”  (p 11)

The OHS regulators have failed to meet their midway target even though the country has seen one of the most expensive safety awareness campaigns in its history and with a major reduction in the manufacturing industries.  No wonder some of them are falling back on the old-school, and expensive, measures of increased inspection and more robust enforcement.

The risk of setting any target is how to account for the failure to reach it.  Keep your eyes open for the preparative work by the regulators’ marketing departments on turning failure into  triumph, or at least in making it into an “SEF” – someone else’s fault.

Kevin Jones

Concatenate Web Development
© Designed and developed by Concatenate Aust Pty Ltd