Category: mining

Latest guidance on working alone

Western Australia’s WorkSafe has just released its latest guidance on working alone and it is the most practical look at the hazard from any OHS regulator in Australia.Working_alone cover

Importantly, it differentiates between “alone” and “remote”.  In 1995, when the Victorian First Aid Code of Practice raised the issue of isolation, there was considerable confusion.  How can someone in the metropolitan area be isolated or remote?

  • Undertaking an assessment of first aid needs of a multi-storey building which has cleaners or nightshift working at 2am.
  • Working alone in a petrol station in an outer suburb.
  • (Sadly) showing a potential client a new property in a new real estate development on the fringes of the city.
  • Security guard walking the perimeter of an industrial site
  • Delivering pizzas at 3am
  • Home visits from medical specialists

The WA definition of “alone” is very useful and needs to be kept front-of-mind in OHS policy and procedure production.  It could be used in the review process of existing policies and prores to ensure their applicability.

“A person is alone at work when they are on their own, when they cannot be seen or heard by another person, and when they cannot expect a visit from another worker or member of the public for some time.”

The working alone guidance identifies four industry types that require special support for working alone:

  • Agriculture
  • Pastoral
  • Forestry
  • Mining

Although SafetyAtWorkBlog advocates low-tech control options as much as possible (usually because of increased reliability) thankfully this guidance discusses mobile phones, satellite communications, GPS locators and other communications devices.

Kevin Jones

The real business cost of safety

In February 2009, BHP Billiton forecast a full-year production target of 130 million tonnes of iron ore.  On 6 May 2009, the BHP president, Ian Ashby, has admitted that the company will be a “few million tonnes short”.  The reason?  Workplace deaths.

Ian Ashby was talking at a conference yesterday and pledged to improve safety however BHP, as has been pointed out in previous SafetyAtWorkBlog postings, has professed to place a high value on safety and its staff for some years.  This is not a new issue for the company and that is what makes the statements of the president potentially hollow.

It is useful to look at the areas that Ashby has identified for additional attention for the implication is that this is where the OHS management system has been deficient.  The measures to be adopted, according to media reports, include

  • restricting access,
  • improving traffic management, and 
  • suspending non-essential night-shift work.

In 2008 the spot price for iron ore had reached $US190 per tonne.  In late 2008, the price fell to $US77 per tonne.  BHP is currently negotiating prices for its iron ore so no accurate figure of value is available.  But let’s allocate a conservative figure of 3 million tonnes to the Ashby quote above and perform a rough calculation for the cost of poorly managed OHS in BHP.

      3 million x $US77 = $US231 million; or 

      3 million x $US190 = $US570 million

Following the economic crisis of 2008-09, shareholders are going to be less forgiving on corporate performance.  This has already been seen on the issue of executive salaries but the BHP experience should have shareholders asking why the management activity has not kept up with the safety rhetoric and the corporate values.  Because soon the poor safety practices in the outback mines of Australia will be hitting the shareholders’ pockets and they are justified in expecting answers form the executives.

The trap for shareholders is to forget the deaths of the workers and only hear the commitments of the executives for the future.  Should one believe the future promises when the corporate values of safety have not been upheld in the recent past?

Note: an independent government review was undertaken and a report was handed to the government in early May.  The report has yet to be released and may not be.

Kevin Jones

UPDATE: 8 May 2009

A spokesperson for the West Australian Dept of Mines & Petroleum has advised SafetyAtWorkBlog that the report into BHP was undertaken under Section 45 of the Act and therefore cannot be released unless in the course of a prosecution.  However, just as has occurred with the Melick Report into the Beaconsfield Mine collapse, there is always hope.

Many workplace deaths for BHP Billiton

The Australian Workers Union are justifiably angry at the latest workplace death associated with BHP Billiton.   According to the company’s media statement on 19 march 2009

“We regret to inform that we have been advised by Mines and Port Development (a Joint Venture of Fluor and SKM), who manage our major construction activities, that there has been a fatal accident involving a John Holland employee at the construction site in Newman.”

The company’s own website provides the background to the union’s concern.

25 February 2009

It is with regret that BHP Billiton Iron Ore advises that an employee, Bob Blake, a track machine operator, aged 56, was fatally injured in a rail accident approximately 74km south of Port Hedland at 3.30am on Tuesday 24 February.

25 February 2009

It is with sadness that BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance (BMA) advises that John Barker, an employee of Nixon Communications working at Blackwater Mine, was fatally injured in a motor vehicle accident at the mine late this morning.   

4 September 2008

We regret to advise that a fatality has occurred at BHP Billiton’s Yandi mining operations involving a HWE Mining employee.

26 August 2008

BHP Billiton Iron Ore regrets to advise that an incident occurred during the night at its Yandi mine site, which resulted in the death of an HWE Mining employee.

29 July 2008

BHP Billiton Iron Ore regrets to advise that an incident occurred at approximately 11.00am today at its Nelson Point operations in Port Hedland, which has resulted in the death of an employee.

17 January 2008

It is with deep regret that BHP Billiton reports that a fatality has occurred today at the Cannington silver, lead and zinc operation in north-west Queensland.

In the “Chairman’s Review” for 2008,  Don Argus wrote about the growth in demand for its products from the Asian region:

Our response has been to streamline our business to enable us to produce as much product as fast as possible within the non-negotiable framework of the highest safety and environmental standards.

The CEO, Marius Kloppers, states that even though the company has achieved its seventh consecutive year of “record attributable profit”

While we can report financial success, I regret to report we have not performed well on safety. In FY2008, 11 of our employees died at work. Many more lives will have been impacted, some forever, by these tragic and avoidable events. We have reflected deeply on what more we must do to reach our goal of Zero Harm. In FY2009, we are making even greater efforts to improve our safety performance.

As shown above, the FY2009 performance statistics are not looking too good.

In the 2008 Corporate Governance Summary, the Directors are lauded.

The non-executive Directors contribute international and operational experience; understanding of the sectors in which we operate; knowledge of world capital markets; and an understanding of the health, safety, environmental and community challenges that we face.

In its 2008 Annual Report under Risk Factors, safety is listed within assets.  It reads like an acceptance that contractors are not living up to their OHS obligations or BHP Billiton standards.  This rings hollow as contractor management should be an area that a company of such size, resources, longevity and experience, manages in an exemplary fashion.

Some of our assets are controlled and managed by joint venture partners or by other companies. Some joint venture partners may have divergent business objectives which may impact business and financial results. Management of our non-controlled assets may not comply with our management and operating standards, controls and procedures (including health, safety, environment). Failure to adopt equivalent standards, controls and procedures at these assets could lead to higher costs and reduced production and adversely impact our results and reputation.

Later in the Risk Factor chapter:

Despite our best efforts and best intentions, there remains a risk that health, safety and/or environmental incidents or accidents may occur that may negatively impact our reputation or licence to operate.

The company is active though.  It has a Code of Conduct that applies to everyone, including contractors.  In it there is a quick test:

If you are in doubt about what to do or whether to speak up, it may help to do the Business Conduct Quick Test by asking yourself some simple questions:

  • The values test: Does it fit with the values in our Charter?
  • The safety test: Could it directly or indirectly endanger someone or cause them injury?
  • The law test: Is it legal and in line with our policies and standards?
  • The conscience test: Does it fit with my personal values?
  • The newspaper test: If the story appeared in the paper, would I feel comfortable with the decision?
  • The family test: What would I tell my partner, parent or child to do?
  • The ‘feel test’: What’s my intuition or ‘gut feel’? If it ‘feels’ bad, then it probably is bad!

Failing any of the above ‘tests’ indicates that you need to talk with someone about the concern you have.

It’s not that BHP Billiton seems to have fallen into a heap in the last couple of years.  Following a major explosion in 2004 at its remote Boodarie Hot Briquette Iron (HBI) plant in Western Australia, it was fined $200,000 plus costs for “failing to provide and maintain a working environment in which employees were not exposed to hazards.”   The explosion killed one worker and injured several others.

The court case revolved around the May 2004 explosion at the Port Hedland Boodarie HBI plant where one man died, and others received severe burns.

The prosecution case was that BHP Billiton undertook two activities, with the potential to cause an explosion, together without a proper risk assessment. This was considered to be a serious and substantial breach of the obligation to provide and maintain a safe working environment.

There is much more OHS performance information available at the BHP Billiton website but it is worth ending this post with the OHS statement included in the Code of Conduct:

BHP Billiton is committed to achieving leading industry practice in health and safety.

In all cases, we will aim to meet or exceed applicable legal and other requirements, as we believe that all accidents and occupational illnesses and injuries are preventable.

Our priority is to ensure that all our people – regardless of where they work or what they do – return home safely.

Kevin Jones

Role of OHS Inspectors

There have been several incidents recently that illustrate the unenviable pressures on inspectors and Australian OHS regulators.

The Tasmanian Coroner found that the mining inspectorate of Workplace Standards Tasmania was “inadequate” and incapable of  “of carrying out its core function of inspecting and enforcing best safety practices within the mining industry.”  Two inspectors for that State’s mining sector- a sector that in 2007/08 was 621 mining leases strong, according to the Annual Report of Mineral Resources Tasmania.

The construction union (CFMEU) in Victoria was highly critical of WorkSafe Victoria following a scaffolding collapse in a main street of the suburb, Prahran.  A similar event occurred in Sydney a couple of days later.

However, OHS legislation clearly states the employer is responsible for safety in workplaces, as WorkSafe reiterated in a press statement.  TV an press reports did not quote the construction union official criticising the construction company or project manager for having the scaffold collapse on their worksite.

(The CFMEU provides a scaffolding checklist on its website.)

In the scaffolding situation a union criticising the OHS regulator is a peculiar distraction from the obvious failure of the organisation that has control of the worksite, the employer.  In the Beaconsfield case, the distraction is just as effective and allows the employer to feel that less attention, less criticism, equates to the incident or the fatality being considered of a lesser significance.

The days of government certification for scaffolding, boilers & Pressure vessels, and a raft of other work items disappeared almost twenty years ago in many Australian States.  One of the reasons this occurred was that regulators realised that by certifying something, by granting official approval, the regulator took on some of the responsibility for the work item.  Most regulators, with government support, realised that it was in their interest to re-emphasise the employers’ legislative obligations that had existed in law for some time.

One does not need to physically visit worksites to encourage “best practice”.  No inspectorate would expect every workplace to be visited by inspectors but high-risk workplaces, such as mines, may have this expectation.  

It seems increasingly popular for the OHS inspectorate to be called in early on high hazard organisations (HHO) projects. (HHO is a concept most recently discussed by Jan Hayes and discussed elsewhere in the works of  Professor Andrew Hopkins)  This enables projects to meet high safety standards in the planning stage.

OHS regulators have a delicate balancing act between consultation and enforcement.  This is a balance that is constantly being tweaked as political, economic and social pressures fluctuate.  The process is not helped b y fingers being pointed in the wrong directions.

Kevin Jones

[NOTE:Professor Michael Quinlan  of  UNSW, Middlesex University and University of Sydney) will be a keynote speaker at the upcoming   Safety in Action 2009 Conference on 2 April 2009 concerning the results of a five-year research report into what OHS Inspectors do and the implications for employers and safety professionals.]

Two different approaches to risk management and safety in Australia

Australian Standards can have a major role to play in the management of safety in workplaces.  They apply to equipment, documents, decisions and can have legislative credibility if required by specific regulations.  Australian Standards are regularly referred to in guidances issued by OHS regulators adding further credibility.  The highest selling standard for many years has been Risk Management.

Unreasonable safety costs

One of SafetyAtWorkBlog’s long-held peeves needs to be stated here.  The standards are produced by a private company, Standards Australia.  The standards are only available for sale.  Small business, in particular, often baulks at OHS improvements because they see OHS management as a large cost for a small return, in a risk management context.  But the standards they need to satisfy regulatory compliance can only to be purchased.

If the Australian government is serious about easing the cost of regulatory compliance, make any Australian Standard that is mentioned in legislation available for free.

But government’s are only interested in reducing indirect OHS costs through paperwork and “red tape”, and OHS compliance requires some level of documentation.

Risk Management

Two important OHS documents that discuss risk management were released within weeks of each other.  First the Australian government released the second and final report of the Review into National Model OHS Laws (OHS Report).  The other report was the findings of the Tasmanian Coroner into the death of Larry Knight.  

The Coroner’s report was highly critical of the Beaconsfield mine’s (BGM) risk management process.

“BGM submits that there has been adequate documentation of its risk management…… I do not accept BGM’s submission” (pages 68-69)

The Coroner goes on to say

“…., the evidence is unclear upon the steps taken by BGM, prior to this decision, in its evaluation of those risks identified by its own risk analysis process. To illustrate:

  • There is no evidence to explain the decision to resume mining in contradiction of Mr Gill’s memorandum which had stipulated that forward modelling be completed beforehand.
  • Mr Gill had, in his memorandum posed the questions, “Are our current ground support standards sufficient for the seismicity being experienced?, and if they aren’t, “What is required?” However, there is not any evidence of BGM having undertaking an assessment of the sufficiency of its ground support standards so that these questions could be answered nor is there any record evidencing why the decision was taken to resume mining without these questions being addressed.
  • Dr Sharrock had identified an important depth of failure issue which Mr Gill acknowledged was raised by him at his close-out meeting yet there is no evidence to explain the evaluation of this concern by BGM and the basis for its rejection.
  • There does not appear to be any evidence of BMG having considered the reevaluation of its ground support after Mr Basson’s modelling results became available although this had been advised by Mr Turner.”  (pages 66-67, my emphasis)

The coroner’s report is full of this type of comment of an inadequate risk management and assessment process.

Reading the report in full generates a big question of how can a company be so deficient in its safety management system and still not be held responsible for the consequences of its actions?

The company remains belligerent  in its defence of the very risk assessment process that the Coroner slammed.  In a media statement, CEO Bill Colvin states

“…the company is disappointed at the lack of acknowledgement of the extensive risk assessment process undertaken by the Beaconsfield Gold mine following the October 2005 rock fall.

“Contrary to comments made by the Coroner, there was rigorous risk assessment, the mine did vary its ground support system and it changed its mining method. Nevertheless, the Coroner did find that no person contributed to the death of Larry Knight.”

Which report was he reading?

Outside of the coronial process, there seems to be sufficient evidence in the coroner’s report for Workplace Standards Tasmania to have another look at prosecuting BGM for failing to ensure that Larry Knight had a healthy and safe work environment.

Review Panel – Risk Management

The Review Panel decided not to include risk management as an enforceable element of national OHS legislation, even though it is a legislative requirement in Queensland.  The panel has reduced the emphasis on risk management by including it only “as part of an object of the model Act.” (page xviii) 

Placing it as an object of the Act puts risk management out of the public’s eye.  If risk management is not part of the obligations of an employer in law, we should not expect business operators to embrace them.  The BGM risk management process was found to be deficient by the Coroner and may have contributed to the death of Larry Knight but the Review Panel sets risk management as an aim and not an enforceable part of model OHS legislation.  It advocated the concept but would not committed

The panel heard, in a submission by Johnstone, Bluff and Quinlan, that

“The Model OHS Act should explicitly require duty holders to undertake systematic OHS management in order to comply with their general duty obligations, and the Act should outline the approach to be taken in a way that integrates the concept of ‘reasonably practicable’ into the process, and also shows how duty holders should use the provisions in regulations and codes of relevance to the issue being addressed in order to comply with the general duty.”

The Review Panel followed the recommendation of the Law Council of Australia that risk management be included in Regulations and not the Act itself.

But then, the review was not a review of occupational health and safety but of occupational health and safety law.  The management of safety was never its focus.

If it had been such a review, or if the government decides that a “safety management review” is warranted in the next few years, there would have been the opportunity to analyse the cost of managing safety and to show how the legal fraternity and the standards setting processes unnecessarily contribute to high compliance costs and red tape.

Risk management was clearly an important business process at Beaconsfield Gold even if the application of the process was poor.  The Coroner said

“one obvious line of defence is to have in place a systematic, comprehensive, rigorous and properly documented risk assessment process.  It is my opinion that BGM did not abide by such a process in the period between the October ’05 rockfalls and Anzac Day 2006.” (page 71)

Larry Knight died on Anzac day 2006.

The Review Panel believes risk management can sit in Regulations and in legislative aims.  Standards Australia continues to charge for its OHS and risk management standards.  The Australian government remains silent on providing free business management information that has the real possibility of saving lives.  Bring on the safety management review!

Kevin Jones

Beaconsfield Coroners report update

There have been several media reports of the disappointment in the findings felt by Larry Knight’s family but little else in the media, particularly over the weekend when some retrospection could have been expected.

However, the Tasmanian workplace relations minister, Lisa Singh, issued a statement last week.  The most significant parts of the statement are

“I was pleased that the coroner Mr Rod Chandler noted in his report that the inspectorate was adequately staffed,” Ms Singh said. “I accept his criticism that at the time of the rock fall that killed Mr Knight, Workplace Standards was not sufficiently resourced to handle some issues of mine safety. That has now been rectified.

“I am seeking further advice on his recommendation that an audit of the office be undertaken each year to ensure that it is properly fulfilling its statutory duties.”

According to a statement from the law firm Maurice Blackburn

“Maurice Blackburn Special counsel Kamal Farouque, who acted as Counsel for the Knight family and the AWU throughout the Coronial Inquest, said that Coroner Rod Chandler’s findings include several major criticisms including:

  • ground support at the mine was inadequate;
  • the mine failed to put in place a comprehensive, rigorous and properly documented risk assessment process; and
  • if a thorough and systematic risk assessment process had been conducted, the likelihood of Mr Knight’s death occurring would have been reduced, perhaps significantly.

“What is plain is that the Coroner has made findings that indicate safety deficiencies,” Mr. Farouque said.

“A lesson to be learned from Mr Knight’s tragic death is the critical importance of proper risk management practices to worker safety, particularly in the mining industry,” Mr. Chandler found.”

Now we wait to see who implements those lessons.

Kevin Jones

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